Credit report accuracy and access to credit by Robert B. Avery et al.
297 
Credit Report Accuracy and Access to Credit 
Robert B. Avery, Paul S. Calem, and Glenn B. Canner, 
of the Board’s Division of Research and Statistics, 
prepared  this  article.  Shannon  C.  Mok  provided 
research assistance. 
Information  that  credit-reporting  agencies  maintain 
on consumers’ credit-related experiences plays a cen­
tral  role  in  U.S.  credit  markets.  Creditors  consider 
such  data  a  primary  factor  when  they  monitor  the 
credit circumstances of current customers and evalu­
ate  the  creditworthiness  of  prospective  borrowers. 
Analysts widely agree that the data enable domestic 
consumer credit markets to function more efﬁciently 
and at lower cost than would otherwise be possible. 
Despite  the  great  beneﬁts  of  the  current  system, 
however, some analysts have raised concerns about 
the accuracy, completeness, timeliness, and consis­
tency of consumer credit records and about the effects 
of  data  limitations  on  the  availability  and  cost  of 
credit. These concerns have grown as creditors have 
begun to rely more on ‘‘credit history scores’’ (statis­
tical characterizations of an individual’s creditworthi­
ness based exclusively on credit record information) 
and  less  on  labor-intensive  reviews  of  the  detailed 
information  in  credit  reports.  Moreover,  decision-
makers in areas unrelated to consumer credit, includ­
ing employment screening and underwriting of prop­
erty and casualty insurance, increasingly depend on 
credit  records,  as  studies  have  shown  that  such 
records have predictive value. 
A  previous  article  in  this  publication  examined 
in  detail  the  credit  records  of  a  large,  nationally 
representative sample of individuals as of June 30, 
1999.1 That analysis revealed the breadth and depth 
of  the  information  in  credit  records.  It  also  found, 
however, that key aspects of the data may be ambig­
uous, duplicative, or incomplete and that such limi­
tations  have  the  potential  to  harm  or  to  beneﬁt 
consumers. 
Although  the  earlier  analysis  contributed  to  the 
debate about the quality of the information in credit 
records, it did not attempt to quantify the effects of 
data limitations on consumers’ access to credit. To 
1.  Robert  B.  Avery,  Raphael  W.  Bostic,  Paul  S.  Calem,  and 
Glenn B. Canner (2003), ‘‘An Overview of Consumer Data and Credit 
Reporting,’’ Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 89 (February), pp. 47–73. 
date, publicly available information about the extent 
of  data  quality  problems  has  been  limited,  as  has 
research on the effects of those problems.2 The lack 
of information has inhibited discussion of the prob­
lems and of the appropriate ways to address them. 
The  main  reason  for  the  lack  of  information  is 
that conducting research on the effects of data limita­
tions on access to credit is complicated. Two factors 
account  for  the  complexity.  First,  the  effects  vary 
depending on the overall composition of the affected 
individual’s credit record. For example, a minor error 
in a credit record is likely to have little or no effect on 
access to credit for an individual with many reported 
account  histories,  but  the  same  error  may  have  a 
signiﬁcant effect on access to credit for someone with 
only a few reported account histories. Second, assess­
ments  of  the  effects  of  data  limitations  require 
detailed knowledge of the model used to evaluate an 
individual’s credit history and of the credit-risk fac­
tors  that  compose  the  model.  Because  information 
about credit-scoring models and their factors is ordi­
narily proprietary, it is difﬁcult to obtain. 
In this article, we expand on the available research 
by presenting an analysis that tackles these complexi­
ties and quantiﬁes the effects of credit record limi­
tations on the access to credit.3 The analysis consid­
ers the credit records of a nationally representative 
sample of individuals, drawn as of June 30, 2003, 
that incorporates improvements in the reporting sys­
tem over the past few years and, consequently, better 
reﬂects today’s circumstances. We examine the pos­
sible  effects  of  data  limitations  on  consumers  by 
estimating the changes in consumers’ credit history 
scores that would result from ‘‘correcting’’ data prob­
lems  in  their  credit  records.  We  also  investigate 
2.  General Accounting Ofﬁce (2003), Consumer Credit: Limited 
Information  Exists  on  Extent  of  Credit  Report  Errors  and  Their 
Implications for Consumers, report prepared for the Senate Commit-
tee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, GAO-03-1036T, July 31, 
pp. 1–18. In 2004, the General Accounting Ofﬁce became the Govern­
ment Accountability Ofﬁce. 
3.  This analysis builds on recent research that attempted to quantify 
the effects of credit record limitations on the access to credit. See 
Robert B. Avery, Paul S. Calem, and Glenn B. Canner (2003), ‘‘Credit 
Reporting  and  the  Practical  Implications  of  Inaccurate  or  Missing 
Information in Underwriting Decisions,’’ paper presented at ‘‘Build­
ing Assets, Building Credit: A Symposium on Improving Financial 
Services  in  Low-Income  Communities,’’  Joint  Center  for  Housing 
Studies, Harvard University, November 18–19. 298  Federal Reserve Bulletin  Summer 2004 
whether different patterns emerge when individuals 
in the sample are grouped by strength of credit his-
tory (credit history score range), depth of credit his-
tory (number of credit accounts in a credit record), 
and selected demographic characteristics (age, rela­
tive income of census tract of residence, and percent-
age of minorities in census tract of residence). Such 
segmentation  allows  us  to  determine  whether  the 
effects of data limitations differ for various subgroups 
of the population. 
CONSUMER CREDIT REPORTS 
A consumer credit report is the organized presenta­
tion of information about an individual’s credit record 
that a credit-reporting agency communicates to those 
requesting information about the credit history of an 
individual. It includes information on an individual’s 
experiences  with  credit,  leases,  non-credit-related 
bills,  collection  agency  actions,  monetary-related 
public records, and inquiries about the individual’s 
credit  history.  Credit  reports,  along  with  credit 
history  scores  derived  from  the  records  of  credit-
reporting  agencies,  have  long  been  considered  one 
of  the  primary  factors  in  credit  evaluations  and 
loan  pricing  decisions.  They  are  also  widely  used 
to  select  individuals  to  contact  for  prescreened 
credit solicitations. More recently, credit reports and 
credit history scores have often been used in identi­
fying potential customers for property and casualty 
insurance  and  in  underwriting  and  pricing  such 
insurance.4 
The  three  national  credit-reporting  agencies— 
Equifax, Experian, and Trans Union—seek to collect 
comprehensive  information  on  all  lending  to  indi­
viduals in the United States, and as a consequence, 
the information that each agency maintains is vast. 
Each one has records on perhaps as many as 1.5 bil­
lion credit accounts held by approximately 210 mil-
lion individuals.5  Together, these agencies generate 
more than 1 billion credit reports each year, provid­
ing  the  vast  majority  of  the  reports  for  creditors, 
employers, and insurers. One study found that con-
4.  For purposes of insurance, the scores are typically referred to as 
insurance scores. 
5.  John A. Ford (2003), chief privacy ofﬁcer of Equifax, Inc., in 
Fair Credit Reporting Act: How It Functions for Consumers and the 
Economy, hearing before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions 
and Consumer Credit of the House Committee on Financial Services, 
House Hearing 108-33, 108 Cong. 2 Sess. (Washington: Government 
Printing  Ofﬁce),  June  4.  Also  see  Consumer  Data  Industry  Asso­
ciation  (formerly  Associated  Credit  Bureaus),  ‘‘About  CDIA,’’ 
www.cdiaonline.org. 
sumers receive only about 16 million of the credit 
reports distributed each year.6 
Credit-reporting agencies collect information from 
‘‘reporters’’—creditors, governmental entities, collec­
tion  agencies,  and  third-party  intermediaries.  They 
generally collect data every month, and they typically 
update their credit records within one to seven days 
after receiving new information. According to indus­
try sources, each agency receives more than 2 bil­
lion  items  of  information  each  month.  To  facili­
tate  the  collection  process  and  to  reduce  reporting 
costs,  the  agencies  have  implemented  procedures 
to  have  data  submitted  in  a  standard  format,  the 
so-called  Metro  format.7  Data  may  be  submitted 
through various media, including CD-ROM and elec­
tronic  data  transfer.  Reporters  submit  information 
voluntarily:  No  state  or  federal  law  requires  them 
to report data to the agencies or to use a particular 
format for their reporting. As a result, the complete­
ness and frequency of reporting can vary. 
Using Credit Records to Evaluate 
Creditworthiness 
In developing credit history scores, builders of credit-
scoring models consider a wide variety of summary 
factors drawn from credit records. In most cases, the 
factors  are  constructed  by  combining  information 
from  different  items  within  an  individual’s  credit 
record. These factors compose the key elements of 
credit models used to generate credit history scores. 
Although hundreds of factors may be created from 
credit  records,  those  used  in  credit-scoring  models 
are the ones proven statistically to be the most valid 
predictors of future credit performance. The factors 
and the weights assigned to each one can vary across 
evaluators and their different models, but the factors 
generally fall into four broad areas: payment history, 
consumer indebtedness, length of credit history, and 
the acquisition of new credit.8 
6.  Loretta  Nott  and  Angle  A.  Welborn  (2003),  A  Consumer’s 
Access  to  a  Free  Credit  Report:  A  Legal  and  Economic  Analysis, 
report  to  the  Congress  by  the  Congressional  Research  Service, 
September 16, pp. 1–14. 
7.  Currently, reporters may submit data in the Metro I or Metro II 
format.  As  of  2005,  the  Metro  II  format  will  be  required  for  all 
submissions. 
8.  For a more detailed discussion of factors considered in credit 
evaluation,  including  the  relative  weights  assigned  to  different 
factors, see the description on the website of Fair Isaac Corporation, 
www.myﬁco.com.  Also  see  Robert  B.  Avery,  Raphael  W.  Bostic, 
Paul S. Calem, and Glenn B. Canner (1996), ‘‘Credit Risk, Credit 
Scoring, and the Performance of Home Mortgages,’’  Federal Reserve 
Bulletin, vol. 82 (July), pp. 621–48. Credit Report Accuracy and Access to Credit  299 
Payment History 
The  most  important  factors  considered  in  credit 
evaluation  are  those  that  relate  to  an  individual’s 
history of repaying loans and any evidence of non-
credit-related  collections  or  money-related  public 
actions. Credit evaluators consider whether an indi­
vidual has a history of repaying balances on credit 
accounts in a timely fashion. The analysis takes into 
account  not  only  the  frequency  of  any  repayment 
problems  but  also  their  severity  (lateness),  date  of 
occurrence  (newness),  and  dollar  magnitude.  Eval­
uators  assess  repayment  performance  on  the  full 
range  of  accounts  that  an  individual  holds,  dis­
tinguishing  accounts  by  type  (such  as  revolving, 
installment,  or  mortgage)  and  by  source  (such  as 
banking  institution,  ﬁnance  company,  or  retailer). 
In  general,  an  individual  with  serious  deﬁcien­
cies  in  repayment  performance,  such  as  a  credit 
account that is currently delinquent, will ﬁnd quali­
fying for new credit difﬁcult, may face higher inter­
est  rates  for  the  credit  received,  or  may  be  lim­
ited  in  further  borrowing  on  existing  revolving 
accounts. 
Consumer Indebtedness 
When evaluating credit, creditors consider the type 
and amount of debt an individual has and the rate of 
credit  utilization.  For  revolving  accounts,  the  rate 
of credit utilization is measured as the proportion of 
available credit in use (outstanding balance divided 
by  the  maximum  amount  the  individual  is  autho­
rized to borrow, referred to as the credit limit). For 
installment  and  mortgage  accounts,  credit  utiliza­
tion is generally measured as the proportion of the 
original  loan  amount  that  is  unpaid.  High  rates  of 
credit  utilization  are  generally  viewed  as  an  addi­
tional risk factor in credit evaluations, as they may 
indicate  that  an  individual  has  tapped  all  available 
credit to deal with a ﬁnancial setback, such as a loss 
of income. 
Length of Credit History 
Credit evaluators consider the length of a person’s 
credit history because it provides information about 
how long the individual has been involved in credit 
markets and about whether he or she has obtained 
credit recently. The age of the account is relevant to 
an evaluation of credit quality because the longer the 
account has been open, the more information it con­
veys about an individual’s willingness and ability to 
make  payments  as  scheduled.  New  accounts  may 
convey little information other than that a consumer 
has had a recent need for additional credit and has 
been approved for credit. 
Acquisition of New Credit 
Whether  a  person  is  seeking  new  credit  provides 
information about the credit risk posed by the indi­
vidual. The number of new accounts the individual 
has recently established and the number of attempts 
to obtain additional loans, as conveyed by records of 
recent creditor inquiries (requests for credit reports), 
all provide a picture of the individual’s recent credit 
proﬁle.9  Attempts  to  open  a  relatively  large  num­
ber of new accounts may signal that a person risks 
becoming overextended. 
Calculating a Credit History Score 
Statistical modelers working with data from credit-
reporting  agencies  construct  credit  history  scores 
using selected factors of the types described above. 
Modelers divide each factor into ranges and assign 
each range a point count. The score for an individual 
is the sum of these points over all factors considered 
in the model. Typically, the points and the factors 
used in the model are derived from a statistical analy­
sis of the relationship between the factors at an initial 
date and the credit performance over a subsequent 
period. 
Role of the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
Although  participation  by  reporters  in  the  credit-
reporting process is voluntary, reporters are subject 
to rules and regulations spelled out in the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (FCRA). The FCRA regulates access 
to credit information and prescribes how the agencies 
are to maintain each credit report they hold.10 Under 
the  FCRA,  only  persons  with  a  permissible  pur-
9.  Inquiries made to create a mailing list for sending prescreened 
solicitations or to monitor existing account relationships are omitted 
from  the  credit  reports.  Also  omitted  are  individuals’  requests  for 
copies of their own reports. 
10.  For a discussion of how the FCRA governs and encourages 
accurate credit reporting, see Michael Staten and Fred Cate (2003), 
‘‘Does the Fair Credit Reporting Act Promote Accurate Credit Report­
ing?’’  paper presented at ‘‘Building Assets, Building Credit: A Sym­
posium  on  Improving  Financial  Services  in  Low-Income  Commu­
nities,’’  Joint  Center  for  Housing  Studies,  Harvard  University, 
November 18–19. 300  Federal Reserve Bulletin  Summer 2004 
from furnishing  information  credit-
11.  About 85 percent of the credit reports that consumers receive 
Provisions of the Fair and Accurate Credit 
Transactions Act of 2003 
The Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 
amended the Fair Credit Reporting Act in several ways. 
The amendments, known collectively as the FACT Act, 
seek to (1) improve the use of credit information and give 
consumers greater access to such information, (2) prevent 
identity  theft  and  facilitate  credit  history  restitution, 
(3) enhance the accuracy of consumer report information, 
(4) limit the sharing and use of medical information in 
the ﬁnancial system, and (5) improve ﬁnancial literacy 
and education. 
The amendments that address the use and availability 
of  credit  information  provide  the  following  consumer 
rights and protections: 
•  The  right  to  obtain  a  free  copy  of  a  consumer 
report. A consumer may request a free credit report once 
a year from each of the national credit-reporting agen­
cies, and each agency must establish a toll-free telephone 
number to receive the requests. A consumer may also 
obtain a credit history score and related information from 
each agency for a ‘‘fair and reasonable’’  fee. For a given 
credit  history  score,  related  information  includes  the 
range of possible scores under the model used to produce 
the score, a list of the key factors (not to exceed four) that 
adversely  affected  the  score,  the  date  the  score  was 
established, and the name of the entity that provided the 
score. 
•  The right to be told when, as a result of negative 
information in a credit report, a creditor has offered 
a consumer credit on terms that are materially less 
favorable than those offered to most other consumers. 
At the time of notiﬁcation, the creditor must provide a 
statement that explains the consumer’s right to obtain a 
free credit report from a credit-reporting agency and that 
provides contact information for obtaining the report (as 
of this writing, the rules for implementing this provision 
were not yet ﬁnal). 
•  Protection against faulty reporting of credit record 
data. Federal supervisors of ﬁnancial institutions must 
establish and maintain guidelines regarding the accuracy 
and integrity of the information that data reporters submit 
to credit-reporting agencies. In certain circumstances, a 
data reporter must reinvestigate a dispute involving the 
information it reported. 
each year are associated with adverse actions. See Nott and Welborn, 
A Consumer’s Access to a Free Credit Report, p. 10. 
12.  For example, if a reporter submits a ﬁle that includes a much  pose for obtaining a credit report—for example, to  larger or a much smaller number of records than have historically 
facilitate a credit transaction, to screen prospective  been received, then the agency will ﬂag the ﬁle for review. Similarly, 
employees,  or  to  underwrite  property  and  casualty  if an unexpectedly large or an unexpectedly small percentage of the 
data items have a given characteristic (for example, the number of insurance  involving  a  consumer—may  have  access  accounts sixty or more days late exceeds a designated threshold), then 
to  this  credit  information.  The  FCRA  prohibits  a  the agency will also ﬂag the data for review. Credit Report Accuracy and Access to Credit  301 
potential for error. For example, because data report­
ing is voluntary and because the ability of the agen­
cies to enforce certain standards is limited, the agen­
cies have had to devise techniques for recognizing 
that  sometimes  data  items  reported  with  the  same 
identifying information, such as the same name, may 
actually  be  associated  with  different  individuals. 
Similarly, a social security number may be missing 
from or may be reported incorrectly in reported infor­
mation on an individual. In such cases, the likelihood 
of associating the reported item with the wrong per-
son increases signiﬁcantly. 
Although the agencies’ data are extensive, they are 
incomplete in two respects. First, not all information 
on  credit  accounts  held  by  individuals  is  reported 
to the agencies. Some small retailers and mortgage 
and ﬁnance companies do not report to the agencies, 
and  individuals,  employers,  insurance  companies, 
and  foreign  entities  typically  do  not  report  loans 
they  extend.  Also,  information  on  student  loans  is 
not always reported. Second, some accounts that are 
reported contain incomplete or out-of-date informa­
tion.  Sometimes  creditors  do  not  report  or  update 
information on the credit accounts of consumers who 
consistently make their required payments as sched­
uled  or  on  the  accounts  of  those  who  have  been 
seriously  delinquent  in  their  payments,  particularly 
accounts with no change in status. Similarly, credit 
limits  established  on  revolving  accounts,  such  as 
credit  cards,  are  not  always  reported  or  updated. 
Moreover, creditors may not notify the agencies when 
an account has been closed, transferred, or assigned 
a  new  payment  status.  For  example,  sometimes 
creditors fail to report delinquent payments that are 
fewer  than  thirty  or  sixty  days  past  due,  and  they 
report changes in payment status only when a more 
serious  payment  problem  arises.  Each  of  these 
possibilities  contributes  to  problems  of  data  com­
pleteness  and  integrity,  and  each  has  the  potential 
to  compromise  the  evaluation  of  an  individual’s 
creditworthiness. 
Another  problem  that  may  compromise  credit 
evaluations concerns the timeliness of the data. The 
information reported on credit accounts reﬂects each 
account’s payment status and outstanding balance as 
of a date shortly before the information is forwarded 
to the agencies. Thus, the information is sensitive to 
the date on which the information is forwarded. For 
example,  a  credit  account  reported  the  day  after  a 
creditor  has  posted  a  payment  to  the  account  will 
show a smaller balance than will the same account 
reported  the  day  before  the  posting.  Similarly,  the 
payment status reﬂected in a credit report is sensitive 
to timing; the record on an account may indicate no 
late payment problems on a given day but may show 
a delinquency if reported to the agency one or two 
days later. 
Besides the accuracy, completeness, and timeliness 
of information in a given credit record, the consis­
tency of information about an individual across agen­
cies  is  an  issue  of  concern.  The  information  may 
differ  from  agency  to  agency  for  several  reasons. 
First, the rules governing the processing of reported 
information differ across agencies. For example, each 
agency  has  its  own  rules  for  determining  whether 
identifying information is sufﬁcient to link reported 
information to a single individual. The inability to 
link reported information accurately in all cases can 
be  an  important  source  of  data  quality  concerns 
because  it  results  in  the  creation  of  ‘‘fragmentary 
ﬁles’’—that  is,  multiple  and  therefore  incomplete 
credit  reports  for  the  same  individual—and  some-
times in the assignment of the wrong credit records 
to  an  individual.  Fragmentary  ﬁles  often  result 
because consumers use different addresses or names 
(for example, after a marriage or a divorce), in some 
cases fraudulently, to obtain credit or other services. 
Each  agency  also  has  its  own  rules  governing 
the  treatment  of  out-of-date  information,  such  as 
accounts  last  reported  to  have  a  positive  balance. 
Second, the agencies receive and post information at 
different times. Third, a given reporter may provide 
information to one or two of the agencies but not to 
all three. Finally, changes made to disputed informa­
tion may be reﬂected only in the credit records of the 
agency that received the disputed claim. 
Although the agencies endeavor to maintain high-
quality data and accurate ﬁles, the degree to which 
consumer  credit  reports  are  accurate,  complete, 
timely,  or  consistent  across  agencies  is  in  dispute. 
Moreover, analysts disagree on the extent to which 
data errors and omissions affect credit history scores. 
A recent analysis by the General Accounting Ofﬁce 
(GAO) cites information drawn from the relatively 
few studies that have attempted to address data accu­
racy  and  importance.13  Speciﬁcally,  the  GAO  cites 
a 2002 joint study by the Consumer Federation of 
America and the National Credit Reporting Associa­
tion that found evidence that the information included 
in the credit reports of any given individual can differ 
widely across agencies.14 This study also found that 
credit history scores based on data from the agencies 
can vary substantially regardless of whether the indi­
vidual has a generally good or a generally bad credit 
13.  General Accounting Ofﬁce, Consumer Credit. 
14.  Consumer Federation of America and National Credit Report­
ing Association (2002), Credit Score Accuracy and Implications for 
Consumers, December 17, www.consumerfed.org. 302  Federal Reserve Bulletin  Summer 2004 
history. As a consequence, the study concluded, ‘‘mil-
lions of consumers are at risk of being penalized by 
inaccurate  credit  report  information  and  inaccurate 
credit scores.’’15 
The GAO report also discusses research on errors 
and  omissions  that  occur  within  the  credit  ﬁles  of 
a single agency. The report highlights different per­
spectives on the data quality issue. For example, one 
investigation by a consumer organization estimated 
that up to 79 percent of credit reports may contain 
some type of error and that about 25 percent of all 
consumer credit reports may contain errors that can 
result in the denial of access to credit.16 A study by 
Arthur  Andersen  and  Company  reviewing  the  out-
comes  for  individuals  who  were  denied  credit  and 
then disputed information in their credit reports con­
cluded, however, that only a small proportion of the 
individuals were denied credit because of inaccurate 
information in their credit reports.17 
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SAMPLE OF CREDIT 
RECORDS 
The Federal Reserve Board obtained from one of the 
three  national  credit-reporting  agencies  the  credit 
records (excluding any identifying personal or credi­
tor  information)  of  a  nationally  representative  ran­
dom sample of 301,000 individuals as of June 30, 
2003.18 The sample data omitted home addresses but 
15.  Consumer Federation of America and National Credit Report­
ing Association, Credit Score Accuracy and Implications for Consum­
ers. The study found that the difference between the high and the low 
credit  history  scores  for  an  individual  across  the  three  agencies 
averaged 41 points (on a scale of 300 to 850) and that about 4 percent 
of individuals had score differences of 100 points or more. 
16.  Alison  Cassady  and  Edmund  Mierzwinski  (2004),  Mistakes 
Do Happen: A Look at Errors in Consumer Credit Reports, National 
Association  of  State  Public  Interest  Research  Groups,  June, 
www.uspirg.org.  Also  see  Jon  Golinger  and  Edmund  Mierzwinski 
(1998), Mistakes Do Happen: Credit Report Errors Mean Consumers 
Lose, U.S. Public Interest Research Group, March, www.uspirg.org. 
17.  Consumer  Data  Industry  Association  (1998),  press  release, 
March  12,  www.cdiaonline.org.  Also  see  Robert  M.  Hunt  (2002), 
‘‘The Development and Regulation of Consumer Credit Reporting in 
America,’’  Working Paper No. 02-21 (Philadelphia: Federal Reserve 
Bank of Philadelphia, November). The study found that 8 percent of 
the consumers who were denied credit requested copies of their credit 
reports. Of these consumers, 25 percent found and disputed errors. Of 
those consumers who found errors, about 12 percent (3 percent of 
those who requested credit reports) eventually received credit because 
of favorable dispute resolutions. 
18.  Agency  ﬁles  include  personal  identifying  information  that 
enables the agencies to distinguish among individuals and construct 
a full record of each individual’s credit-related activities. The records 
received  by  the  Federal  Reserve  excluded  the  personal  identifying 
information that agency ﬁles contain—the consumer’s name, current 
and previous addresses, and social security number—as well as other 
personal information that credit ﬁles sometimes contain—telephone 
included census tracts, states, and counties of resi­
dence.  We  used  this  geographic  information  with 
census 2000 ﬁles—which provide population charac­
teristics, such as income, race, and ethnicity, by cen­
sus tract of residence—to analyze the credit record 
data. 
Four  general  types  of  credit-related  information 
appear in credit records, including those in the Fed­
eral Reserve sample: (1) detailed information from 
creditors  (and  some  other  entities  such  as  utility 
companies)  on  credit  accounts—that  is,  current 
and  past  loans,  leases,  and  non-credit-related  bills; 
(2)  information  reported  by  collection  agencies  on 
actions  associated  with  credit  accounts  and  non-
credit-related bills, such as unpaid medical or utility 
bills;  (3)  information  purchased  from  third  parties 
about  monetary-related  public  records,  such  as 
records of bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax liens (local, 
state, or federal), lawsuits, garnishments, and other 
civil judgments; and (4) information about inquiries 
from creditors regarding an individual’s credit record. 
Credit accounts constitute the bulk of the informa­
tion in the typical individual’s credit record, and thus 
they  compose  the  bulk  of  the  information  that  the 
agencies maintain. Credit account records contain a 
wide range of details about each account, including 
the date that an account was established; the type of 
account, such as revolving, installment, or mortgage; 
the current balance owed; the highest balance owed; 
credit limits if applicable; and payment performance 
information, such as the extent to which payments 
are or have been in arrears for accounts in default. 
A basic element of agency data is information on 
the open or closed status of each account. An account 
is considered open if a credit relationship is ongoing 
and  closed  if  the  consumer  can  no  longer  use  the 
account. Another important element of account infor­
mation is the date on which the information was most 
recently reported. The date is critical in determining 
whether the information on the account in the credit 
agency ﬁles is current or stale (unreported for some 
time and therefore potentially in need of updating). 
Signiﬁcantly less-detailed information is available 
on  collection  agency  accounts,  public  records,  and 
creditor inquiries about a consumer’s credit history. 
Generally, only the amount of the collection or public 
record claim, the name of the creditor, and the date 
last  reported  are  available.  For  creditor  inquiries, 
information is even more limited and includes just 
the type of inquirer and the date of the inquiry. The 
numbers,  name  of  spouse,  number  of  dependents,  income,  and 
employment information. Under the terms of the contract with the 
credit-reporting  agency,  the  data  received  by  the  Federal  Reserve 
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1.	 Individuals with credit-reporting agency records, 
by type of information in credit record, 
as of June 30, 2003 
Type of information in credit record  Number  Share of sample 
(percent) 
Sample size  ..........................  301,536  100.0 
Credit account  ........................  259,211  86.0 
Collection agency account  .............  109,964  36.5 
Public record ..........................  36,742  12.2 
Creditor inquiry1  ......................  188,616  62.6 
None of the above  ....................  15  * 
Memo 
Credit account only  ...................  63,501  21.1 
Collection agency account only  ........  34,978  11.6 
Public record only .....................  53  * 
Creditor inquiry only1  .................  31  * 
Credit account and 
Collection agency account ...........  67,747  22.5 
Public record  .......................  34,715  11.5 
Creditor inquiry1  ....................  182,553  60.5 
Note.  In  this  and  subsequent  tables,  components  may  not  sum  to  totals 
because of rounding. 
1.  Item includes only inquiries made within two years of the date the sample 
was drawn. 
* Less than 0.5 percent. 
agencies  generally  retain  inquiry  information  for 
twenty-four months. 
In  aggregate,  the  Federal  Reserve  sample  con­
tained  information  on  about  3.7  million  credit 
accounts,  more  than  318,000  collection-related 
actions,  roughly  65,000  monetary-related  public 
record actions, and about 913,000 creditor inquiries. 
Not every individual had information of each type. In 
the sample, approximately 260,000, or 86 percent, of 
the individuals had records of credit accounts as of 
the date the sample was drawn (table 1).19 Although 
a  large  portion  of  individuals  had  items  indicating 
collection agency accounts, public record actions, or 
creditor inquiries, only a very small share (well less 
than 1 percent) of the individuals with credit records 
had  only  public  record  items  or  only  records  of 
creditor inquiries. However, for about 12 percent of 
the individuals, the only items in their credit records 
were collection actions. 
Credit History Scores in the Sample 
The credit-reporting agency provided credit history 
scores for about 250,000, or 83 percent, of the indi­
viduals in the sample. The agency used its propri-
19.  The credit account information was provided by 92,000 report­
ers, 23,000 of which had reported within three months of the date the 
sample was drawn. 








Below 550  550–600  601–660  661–700  701 and above 
Credit history score 
NOTE.  Data are from a Federal Reserve sample drawn as of June 30, 2003. 
The distribution is composed of individuals in the sample who had been 
assigned credit history scores. Authors have adjusted the scores, which are 
proprietary, to match the distribution of the more familiar FICO credit history 
scores, developed by Fair Isaac Corporation. 
etary  credit-risk-scoring  model  as  of  the  date  the 
sample  was  drawn  to  generate  the  scores  (one  for 
each individual), which it constructed from selected 
factors of the type described previously. The propri­
etary credit-risk score is like other commonly used 
consumer credit history scores in that larger values 
indicate greater creditworthiness. The agency did not 
assign scores to anyone who did not have a credit 
account. A small proportion of individuals without 
scores  did  have  credit  accounts,  but  most  of  these 
individuals were not legally responsible for any debt 
owed. 
To facilitate this discussion, we have adjusted the 
proprietary credit-risk scores assigned to individuals 
in the Federal Reserve sample to match the distribu­
tion of the more familiar FICO credit history scores, 
for which information is publicly available.20 Among 
the individuals in our sample who had scores, about 
60  percent  had  adjusted  scores  of  701  or  above 
(chart 1). Individuals with FICO scores in this range 
are  relatively  good  credit  risks.  According  to  Fair 
Isaac Corporation, less than 5 percent of such con-
20.  For  a  national  distribution  of  FICO  scores,  see 
www.myﬁco.com/myﬁco/creditcentral/scoringworks.asp.  All  three 
agencies use versions of the FICO score, which is generated from 
software developed by the Fair Isaac Corporation. Each agency gives 
the score a different name. Equifax calls it the Beacon score; Expe­
rian, the Experian/Fair Isaac Risk score; and Trans Union, the Em­
pirica  score.  In  developing  the  scores,  Fair  Isaac  used  the  same 
methods at each agency but estimated the FICO model differently at 
each one, using separate samples. Thus, just as the information about 
an individual can differ across the three companies, so can the FICO 
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sumers are likely to become seriously delinquent on 
any debt payment over the next two years.21 In con­
trast, about 13 percent of individuals in our sample 
had adjusted scores at or below 600. According to 
Fair  Isaac,  more  than  half  of  these  consumers  are 
likely to become seriously delinquent on a loan over 
the next two years. 
Because credit history scores can be used to mea­
sure credit risk, creditors use them, along with other 
measures  of  creditworthiness,  such  as  collateral, 
income, and employment information, to determine 
whether to extend credit and, if so, on what terms. 
Credit  history  scores  are  closely  aligned  with  the 
interest rates offered on loans—that is, higher scores 
are associated with lower interest rates. For example, 
as of August 30, 2004, the national average interest 
rate  for  a  thirty-year  ﬁxed-rate  conventional  mort­
gage for an individual with a FICO score of 720 or 
more was 5.75 percent, whereas the average interest 
rate  for  someone  with  a  score  below  560  was 
9.29 percent.22 
Assessing the Effects of Data Limitations 
The analysis to assess the potential effects of data 
limitations  on  an  individual’s  access  to  credit 
involves two steps: identifying data problems in an 
individual’s credit record and simulating the effects 
of ‘‘correcting’’  each problem on the availability or 
price of credit as represented by the change in the 
individual’s credit history score. To conduct this exer­
cise, one must know (1) the factors used to construct 
the score, (2) the points assigned to these factors in 
deriving  an  individual’s  score,  and  (3)  the  process 
used to create the underlying factors from the original 
credit records. 
The  Federal  Reserve’s  sample  includes  all  the 
information that would be necessary to construct any 
credit history score and its underlying factors from 
the original credit records. However, the details of 
the  credit-reporting  agency’s  credit-scoring  model, 
including  the  factors  and  point  scales  used  in  the 
model, are proprietary and were not made available 
to the Federal Reserve. Nevertheless, we were able to 
approximate the model by using three types of infor-
21.  The  term  ‘‘seriously  delinquent’’  means  falling  behind  on  a 
loan payment ninety days or more, defaulting on a loan, or ﬁling for 
bankruptcy. 
22.  See www.myﬁco.com. Loan rate includes 1 discount percent-
age point and is based on a loan amount of $150,000 for a single-
family, owner-occupied property and on an 80 percent loan-to-value 
ratio. As the data on the web site show, interest rates vary little by 
credit history score for individuals with scores above 700. 
mation: (1) the proprietary credit-risk score assigned 
to each individual in our sample; (2) a large set of 
credit factors for each individual—a subset of which 
was known to comprise the factors used in the propri­
etary credit-scoring model; and (3) detailed account-
level information in each individual’s credit record. 
We used the ﬁrst two items to construct an approxi­
mation  of  the  proprietary  credit-scoring  model, 
employing  regression  techniques  to  estimate  the 
points to assign to each factor. We used the second 
and  third  items  to  ‘‘reverse-engineer’’  the  credit 
factors included in our version of the credit-scoring 
model.  This  information  enabled  us  to  recalculate 
how  the  factors—and  ultimately  the  credit  history 
scores—would change if alterations were made to the 
underlying credit records so that we could simulate 
the effects of correcting a data problem or omission. 
Because  of  the  numerous  potential  factors  and 
speciﬁcations that could have been used to construct 
the proprietary credit-risk score, our version of the 
credit-scoring  model  undoubtedly  differs  from  the 
actual proprietary model. However, we were able to 
identify almost exactly the process used to construct 
the  factors  in  the  actual  model  from  the  underly­
ing credit records. Moreover, the approximated and 
actual model scores corresponded quite closely. Thus, 
we  believe  that  our  approximation  of  the  scoring 
process provides a reasonable estimate of the poten­
tial effects of a change in a credit record item on an 
individual’s credit history score. 
Other model builders consider different credit-risk 
factors in creating their scoring models, assign differ­
ent points to the factors, and employ different rules 
for constructing the factors. As a consequence, even 
if  we  had  identiﬁed  the  proprietary  model  exactly, 
the results of our analysis would not necessarily have 
been  the  same  as  those  implied  by  other  models. 
Nevertheless, our results should be viewed as indi­
cative of the implications of data quality issues for 
scoring models in general and as applicable in many, 
if not all, respects. 
DATA QUALITY ISSUES 
As noted earlier, a previous article in this publication 
examined in detail the credit records of a sample of 
individuals as of June 30, 1999, and found that key 
aspects of the data were ambiguous, duplicative, or 
incomplete.  The  article  highlighted  four  areas  of 
concern: (1) The current status of ‘‘stale’’  accounts, 
which  show  positive  balances  (amounts  owed  that 
are greater than zero) but are not currently reported, 
is  ambiguous;  (2)  some  creditors  fail  to  report Credit Report Accuracy and Access to Credit  305 
credit account information, including nonderogatory 
accounts (accounts whose payments are being made 
as scheduled) or minor delinquencies (accounts 30 to 
119 days in arrears); (3) credit limits are sometimes 
unreported; and (4) the reporting of data on collection 
agency accounts and public records may be inconsis­
tent or may contain redundancies, and some of the 
items regarding creditor inquiries are often missing. 
Our simulations, discussed below, address these areas 
of concern. 
Ambiguous Status of Stale Accounts 
A primary concern about data quality involves stale 
accounts.  About  29  percent  of  all  accounts  in  the 
sample showed positive balances at their most recent 
reporting,  but  the  report  date  was  more  than  three 
months before the sample was drawn. These accounts 
fell into one of three categories based on their status 
when last reported: major derogatory (accounts that 
are  120  days  or  more  in  arrears  and  involve  a 
payment  plan,  repossession,  charge-off,  collection 
action,  bankruptcy,  or  foreclosure),  minor  delin­
quency, or paid as agreed. Of all stale accounts with a 
positive balance at last report, about 15 percent were 
reported  to  be  major  derogatories,  3  percent  were 
minor  delinquencies,  and  82  percent  were  paid  as 
agreed. 
Analysis of the credit records in the sample sug­
gests that many of these stale accounts, particularly 
those  involving  mortgages  and  installment  loans, 
were  likely  to  have  been  closed  or  transferred  but 
were not reported as such. Many were reported by 
creditors  that  were  no  longer  reporting  data  to  the 
agency about any individuals when the sample was 
drawn, and thus information on these accounts was 
unlikely  to  be  up  to  date.  The  signiﬁcant  fraction 
of  positive-balance  stale  accounts  that  were  likely 
closed  or  transferred  implies  that  some  consumers 
will show higher current balances and a larger num­
ber of open accounts than they actually hold. 
Because the current status of stale accounts is often 
unclear, users of consumer credit reports must obtain 
additional  information  or  make  assumptions  about 
the  status.  In  credit-scoring  models,  such  assump­
tions are inherent in ‘‘stale-account rules’’  that credit 
modelers typically apply when they calculate an indi­
vidual’s  credit  history  score.  A  stale-account  rule 
deﬁnes the period for which reporting is considered 
current and thus identiﬁes stale accounts. The rule 
also dictates how accounts identiﬁed as stale should 
be  treated.  In  most  cases,  the  rule  treats  them  as 
closed accounts with zero balances. 
To some extent, rules that consider stale accounts 
closed and paid off may mitigate concerns about stale 
account information. Another possible mitigating fac­
tor is that consumers who review their credit reports 
for mistakes are likely to catch stale-account errors 
and  to  have  them  corrected.  Nevertheless,  stale-
account rules and consumer action can only partially 
correct  the  problem  of  noncurrent  information  in 
credit  account  records.  For  example,  a  rule  that  is 
conservative in identifying stale accounts may permit 
noncurrent information to be used over an extended 
period, whereas an overly aggressive rule may nullify 
information that is still current. 
Failure to Report Credit Account Information 
Some  reporters  provide  incomplete  performance 
information  on  their  accounts,  and  others  fail  to 
report any information about some credit accounts. 
For example, in the Federal Reserve sample, 2.7 per-
cent  of  the  large  creditors  reported  only  credit 
accounts  with  payment  problems.23  The  failure  to 
report accounts in good standing likely affected the 
credit evaluations of consumers with such accounts. 
The  way  in  which  credit  evaluations  are  affected 
depends  on  the  circumstances  of  an  account.  For 
consumers  with  a  low  utilization  of  nonreported 
accounts, the failure to report may worsen their credit 
evaluations. For consumers with a high utilization of 
nonreported accounts, however, the failure to report 
may  result  in  better  credit  evaluations  than  are 
warranted. 
In  addition,  some  creditors  report  minor  delin­
quent accounts as performing satisfactorily until the 
accounts become seriously delinquent. Almost 6 per-
cent  of  the  large  creditors  in  the  Federal  Reserve 
sample  followed  this  practice.  Because  the  credit 
histories for consumers who fall behind in their pay­
ments to such lenders appear somewhat better in the 
credit records than they actually are, these consumers 
may beneﬁt from such underreporting. 
Finally,  some  lenders  withhold  account  informa­
tion. For example, in 2003, Sallie Mae, the nation’s 
largest provider of student loans, decided to withhold 
information  on  its  accounts  from  two  of  the  three 
credit-reporting agencies. Clearly, while this policy 
was in effect, the failure to report information harmed 
some consumers and beneﬁted others depending on 
23.  Some lenders, particularly those that specialize in lending to 
higher-risk individuals (referred to here as subprime lenders), choose 
to withhold positive performance information about their customers 
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whether the withheld information was favorable or 
unfavorable. 
Unreported Credit Limits 
A  key  factor  that  credit  evaluators  consider  when 
they assess the creditworthiness of an individual is 
credit utilization. If a creditor fails to report a credit 
limit  for  an  account,  credit  evaluators  must  either 
ignore utilization or use a substitute measure such as 
the highest-balance level—that is, the largest amount 
ever owed on the account. Substituting the highest-
balance  level  for  the  credit  limit  generally  results 
in  a  higher  estimate  of  credit  utilization  because 
the  highest-balance  amount  is  typically  lower  than 
the credit limit; the higher estimate leads, in turn, to 
a  higher  perceived  level  of  credit  risk  for  affected 
consumers. 
For  the  June  30,  1999,  sample  of  individuals, 
proper utilization rates could not be calculated (the 
highest-balance levels had to be used) for about one-
third  of  the  open  revolving  accounts  because  the 
creditors had not reported the credit limits. At that 
time, about 70 percent of the consumers in the sample 
had  missing  credit  limits  on  one  or  more  of  their 
revolving  accounts.  Circumstances  have  improved 
substantially  since  then  because  public  and  private 
efforts  to  encourage  the  reporting  of  credit  limits 
have resulted in more-consistent reporting. Neverthe­
less, in the sample drawn as of June 30, 2003, credit 
limits were missing for about 14 percent of revolving 
accounts, and the omissions affected about 46 percent 
of the consumers in the sample. Thus, although the 
incidence of missing credit limits has fallen substan­
tially, it remains an important data quality issue. 
Problems with Collection Agency Accounts, 
Public Records, and Creditor Inquiries 
Data on collection agency accounts, public records, 
and creditor inquiries are a source of inconsistency, 
redundancy,  and  missing  information  in  credit 
records. 
Collection Agency Accounts 
Evidence  suggests  that  collection  agencies  handle 
claims in an inconsistent manner. Most notably, some 
collection agencies may report only larger collection 
amounts to credit-reporting agencies, whereas others 
may report claims of any size.24 Inconsistent report­
ing does not imply inaccuracy of the information that 
does get reported, but it does imply some arbitrari­
ness  in  the  way  individuals  with  collections  are 
treated.  Those  whose  collection  items  happen  to 
be reported to the credit-reporting agency will have 
lower  credit  history  scores  than  will  those  whose 
collection items go unreported. This situation raises 
the  question  as  to  the  extent  and  effect  of  such 
arbitrary  differences  in  treatment,  particularly  for 
small  collection  amounts.  In  addition,  anecdotes 
abound  about  consumers  who  have  had  difﬁculty 
resolving disputes over collection items or who have 
had  trouble  removing  erroneous  items  from  their 
credit records. 
Another potentially important data quality issue for 
collection agency accounts is duplication of accounts 
within  collection  agency  records.  Duplications  can 
occur, for example, when a collection company trans­
fers a claim to another collection company. Dupli­
cations can also occur when a debt in collection is 
satisﬁed  but  the  paid  collection  is  recorded  as  a 
separate line item by the collection agency. Analysis 
of the collection agency accounts in the latest Federal 
Reserve  sample  suggests  that  about  5  percent  of 
collection items are likely duplications resulting from 
such transfers or payouts. 
Credit  evaluators  also  have  some  concern  about 
the appropriateness of using medical collection items 
in  credit  evaluations  because  these  items  (1)  are 
relatively more likely to be in dispute, (2) are incon­
sistently reported, (3) may be of questionable value 
in predicting future payment performance, or (4) raise 
issues of rights to privacy and fair treatment of the 
disabled  or  ill.  The  last  concern  recently  received 
special attention with the inclusion of provisions in 
the  FACT  Act  that  address  medical-related  collec­
tions.  One  provision  requires  the  credit-reporting 
agencies  to  restrict  information  that  identiﬁes  the 
provider or the nature of medical services, products, 
or  devices  unless  the  agencies  have  a  consumer’s 
afﬁrmative consent. In the future, the agencies may 
be  able  to  meet  this  requirement  by  using  a  code, 
with the name of the creditor suppressed, to distin­
guish medical-related collections from other collec­
tions. Because the coding system is prospective, how-
ever,  even  if  implemented  today,  years  may  pass 
before all the collection items in the agency ﬁles have 
this code. In the interim, if the name of the creditor 
is suppressed, distinguishing medical collection items 
24.  One indication of the inconsistent reporting of collection items 
is the wide dispersion across states in the ratio of small collection 
items to all collection agency accounts. The percentage ranges from 
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will  depend  on  the  ability  of  the  credit-reporting 
agencies to mechanically code historical data. If such 
coding is done imperfectly, it may adversely affect 
consumers who deal with creditors that want to dis­
count collection items involving medical incidents. 
(As of September 2004, at least one of the agencies 
had developed a system that suppresses the name of 
the creditor and uses a code to distinguish medical-
related collections.) 
Public Records 
Public  records  suffer  from  similar  consistency  and 
duplication problems that affect collection items. In 
particular, a single episode can result in one or more 
public record items depending on how it is recorded. 
For  example,  tax  liens  can  be  recorded  on  a  con­
solidated basis or treated as separate items. Similarly, 
amendments  to  a  public  record  ﬁling,  such  as  a 
bankruptcy  or  a  foreclosure,  can  be  treated  as 
updates, which result in no change in the number of 
items, or as new ﬁlings. 
In  addition,  evidence  suggests  that  the  credit-
reporting agencies inconsistently gather information 
on lawsuits that the courts have not yet acted on, in 
part because some agency ofﬁcials believe that the 
mere ﬁling of a lawsuit does not necessarily relate 
to future credit performance. For the most part, such 
lawsuits are missing from the public records. How-
ever, for idiosyncratic reasons, some lawsuits have 
been  reported  in  nonrandom  ways.  Speciﬁcally, 
80  percent  of  the  lawsuits  in  the  Federal  Reserve 
sample came from only two states, an indication that 
residents of these states may be at a disadvantage in 
credit evaluations. 
About one-fourth of non-bankruptcy-related public 
records reﬂect dismissals. In such cases, the courts 
seem to have determined that the individuals are not 
legally liable. Such information may be of question-
able value for credit evaluations. 
Creditor Inquiries 
Although credit evaluators use information on credi­
tor inquiries to predict future loan performance, the 
value of this information is limited in an important 
way. Ideally, credit evaluators would use such infor­
mation to distinguish the consumers who are seeking 
multiple loans to greatly expand their borrowing from 
the consumers who are shopping for the best terms 
for  a  single  loan.  However,  the  information  that 
evaluators need to make this distinction—that is, a 
code  that  identiﬁes  the  type  of  credit  sought  from 
the  inquiring  lender—is  generally  not  available  in 
inquiry  records  (it  is  missing  from  99  percent  of 
the inquiries in the Federal Reserve sample). Conse­
quently, credit evaluators must use less reliable rules, 
potentially harming consumers who are simply shop-
ping for a single loan by failing to distinguish them 
sufﬁciently  from  consumers  who  are  seeking  an 
excessive amount of credit. 
DESIGN OF THE SIMULATIONS 
We designed a series of simulations to estimate the 
potential effects of the data quality issues identiﬁed in 
the  preceding  section.  Each  simulation  identiﬁed  a 
set of ‘‘data problems’’ or potential problems, applied 
a plausible ‘‘correction’’  to each problem, and used 
an approximation of the proprietary credit-risk model 
to evaluate the effect of the correction on the credit 
history scores of individuals who had the problem in 
their credit records.25 We estimated how many con­
sumers each data problem affected; and for those who 
were affected, we estimated how many would see a 
decrease or an increase in their scores and by how 
much when the problem was corrected. 
Selecting Factors in the Approximated Model 
The ﬁrst step in setting up the simulations was select­
ing  the  factors  to  be  used  in  the  approximated 
credit-scoring model. The approximated model used 
seventy-three factors, including the number of credit 
accounts  of  different  types  and  the  various  char­
acterizations  of  payment  history  patterns,  such  as 
the number of accounts with all payments made on 
time, in various stages of delinquency, or with major 
derogatory  status.  Also  included  were  measures 
of  outstanding  balances,  credit  limits  on  revolving 
accounts, ages of credit accounts, variables derived 
from collection agency accounts and public records, 
and  account  inquiry  information.  Our  discussions 
with credit evaluators suggested that most credit his-
tory models are based on a smaller number of factors 
than were included here. However, most of the ‘‘addi­
tional’’  variables in our model were decompositions 
or interactions that involved more general factors and 
were unlikely to lead to signiﬁcant distortions in our 
representations of the effects of data quality issues. 
25.  We use the terms ‘‘data problem’’  and ‘‘correction’’  in their 
broadest sense. For example, ‘‘data problem’’  may mean an actual 
problem  or  only  a  potential  problem.  Similarly,  ‘‘correction’’  may 
mean a solution to a problem or simply a ‘‘best guess’’ at a solution. 308  Federal Reserve Bulletin  Summer 2004 
2.	 Share of individuals with selected factors used in credit evaluation, distributed by type of account 
Percent except as noted 
Factor used 
credit evaluation 
Number of credit 
No account .................. 
1  ........................... 
2  ........................... 
3–5  ......................... 
6–8  ......................... 
9 or more  ................... 
Total  ................... 
Number of open cr 
accounts paid as 
0  ........................... 
1  ........................... 
2  ........................... 
3–5  ......................... 
6–8  ......................... 
9 or more  ................... 
Total  ................... 
Number of credit 
opened in most-recent 
12 months1 
0  ........................... 
1  ........................... 
2 or more  ................... 
Total  ................... 
Years since most-r 
credit account opened 
0  ........................... 
Less than 1 .................. 
1–2  ......................... 
3–4  ......................... 
5 or more  ................... 
Total  ................... 
Age of oldest credit 
(years)2 
No oldest account 
Less than 1 .................. 
1–4  ......................... 
5–9  ......................... 
10 or more  .................. 
Total  ................... 
Amount owed on 
nonmortgage credit 
(dollars) 
0  ........................... 
1–499 ....................... 
500–999  .................... 
1,000–4,999 ................. 
5,000–9,999 ................. 
10,000 or more  .............. 
Total  ................... 
Utilization rate for 
accounts (percent) 
No account or not 
calculable  .............. 
0  ........................... 
1–24 ........................ 
25–49 ....................... 
50 or more  .................. 
Total  ................... 
Share of individuals 
credit accounts never 
delinquent 




91 or more  .................. 
Total  ................... 
Factor used in 
credit evaluation 
Type of account 
Revolving  Installment  Mortgage  Total 
Number of credit accounts 
30 days past due in past 
12 months 
0 ..............................  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  75 
1 ..............................  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  13 
2 ..............................  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  5 
3 or more ......................  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  7 
Total  .....................  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  100 
Number of credit accounts 
60 days past due in past 
12 months 
0 ..............................  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  82 
1 ..............................  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  10 
2 ..............................  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  4 
3 or more ......................  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  4 
Total  .....................  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  100 
Number of credit accounts 
90 days past due in past 
12 months 
0 ..............................  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  86 
1 ..............................  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  8 
2 ..............................  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  3 
3 or more ......................  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  3 
Total  .....................  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  100 
Number of credit accounts 
more than 90 days past due 
0 ..............................  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  68 
1 ..............................  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  11 
2 ..............................  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  6 
3 or more ......................  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  15 
Total  .....................  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  100 
Worst delinquency ever on 
credit account (number of 
days delinquent) 
0 ..............................  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  51 
30 .............................  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  12 
60 .............................  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  5 
90 .............................  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  2 
120  ...........................  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  4 
More than 120  .................  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  26 
Total  .....................  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  100 
Balance owed on collection 
accounts (dollars) 
No collection account or 
zero balance owed .........  . . .  . . .  . . .  73 
1–99  ..........................  . . .  . . .  . . .  2 
100–499 .......................  . . .  . . .  . . .  9 
500–999 .......................  . . .  . . .  . . .  5 
1,000 or more ..................  . . .  . . .  . . .  11 
Total  .....................  . . .  . . .  . . .  100 
Number of public records 
0 ..............................  . . .  . . .  . . .  86 
1 ..............................  . . .  . . .  . . .  9 
2 or more ......................  . . .  . . .  . . .  5 
Total  .....................  . . .  . . .  . . .  100 
Number of creditor inquiries 
in past 6 months 
0 ..............................  . . .  . . .  . . .  55 
1 ..............................  . . .  . . .  . . .  20 
2 ..............................  . . .  . . .  . . .  11 
3 ..............................  . . .  . . .  . . .  6 
4 or more ......................  . . .  . . .  . . .  8 
Total  .....................  . . .  . . .  . . .  100 
Note.  Data include only individuals with at least one credit account (of any  is authorized to borrow). The rate cannot be calculated in all cases because of 
type) and a credit history score.  unreported information on credit limit, highest balance, or outstanding balance. 
1.  Data for revolving accounts include only bank-issued credit cards.  . . .  Not applicable. 
2.  Data for installment accounts include only bank-issued installment loans.  n.a.  Not available. 
3.  Utilization rate is the proportion of available credit in use (outstanding 
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We report many of the factors used in our model 
and show the distribution of individuals in the sample 
across each factor (table 2). For example, more than 
60 percent of the individuals in the sample who had 
a record of a credit account had information on nine 
or more accounts, and more than half the individuals 
had opened at least one new account within twelve 
months of the date the sample was drawn. The pat-
terns show that payment performance varies greatly 
among  individuals:  Although  about  two-thirds  of 
individuals  had  never  been  more  than  ninety  days 
past due on a credit account, 15 percent had been this 
late on three or more accounts. In addition, nearly 
15 percent had a record of at least one bankruptcy, 
tax lien, or other monetary-related public action, each 
of which weighs heavily in credit evaluations. 
Estimating the Approximated Model 
To  estimate  our  approximation  of  the  proprietary 
credit-scoring  model,  we  used  standard  statistical 
regression  techniques  to  ﬁt  the  actual  proprietary 
credit-risk score against the selected credit factors for 
the individuals in the sample data. Although credit 
modelers typically break factors into ranges, because 
we  did  not  know  the  break  points  that  had  been 
selected,  we  approximated  the  process  with  linear 
splines.26  For  the  estimation,  the  sample  included 
only  individuals  with  proprietary  credit-risk  scores 
who  had  not  ﬁled  for  bankruptcy.  Our  simulations 
were also restricted to this sample.27 
We  estimated  the  regression  equation  separately 
for three subpopulations. The ﬁrst group consisted of 
individuals with one or more major derogatory credit 
accounts  in  their  credit  records.  Both  the  second 
and  third  groups  consisted  of  individuals  who  had 
no major derogatory accounts, but individuals in the 
second group had no more than two credit accounts 
whereas those in the third group had more than two 
credit  accounts.  We  conducted  the  analysis  in  this 
way  because  allowing  the  estimated  coefﬁcients  to 
26.  The use of linear approximations rather than ranges is likely to 
mean that our simulations implied more small but consistent changes 
in  credit  history  scores  when  factors  were  altered  than  would  the 
‘‘true’’ model, which divides consumers into two groups: those whose 
scores did not change because they stayed within the same range and 
those whose scores changed more substantially because they moved to 
a different range. 
27.  Although individuals who had ﬁled for bankruptcy or did not 
have a proprietary credit-risk score were excluded from our analysis, 
these individuals may also have been affected by data quality prob­
lems. However, because they had not been scored or they had ﬁled 
for bankruptcy, they were likely subject to a different type of credit 
review process, one that may have provided greater opportunities for 
the loan underwriter to identify and address data quality problems. 
differ across population subgroups provided a notice-
ably better ﬁt. The approach was also consistent with 
the  common  industry  practice  of  using  different 
‘‘scorecards’’  for different subpopulations. The R2 (a 
statistic characterizing how well a model ﬁts the data) 
for each of the three subpopulation regressions was 
about 0.85, and the combined R2 for the full popula­
tion was about 0.94. 
Proprietary considerations constrain our ability to 
report details of the regression equation speciﬁcation 
or the coefﬁcient estimates. However, a few variables 
in the estimated credit-scoring model were statisti­
cally insigniﬁcant and sometimes exhibited an unex­
pected relationship to the credit history score. As a 
consequence, as will be seen below, simulations of 
the effects of changes in an individual’s credit record 
led in a few instances to anomalous outcomes in the 
sense that some scores moved in unexpected direc­
tions when changes in the individual’s credit record 
were simulated. 
Conducting the Simulations 
As noted, the simulations identiﬁed problems in the 
data  and  applied  hypothetical  corrections  to  them. 
Only in the case of missing credit limits, however, 
could  we  identify  the  problem  unambiguously.  In 
other cases—speciﬁcally, stale accounts and the data 
quality  issues  associated  with  collections,  public 
records, and inquiries—we could determine only that 
the information was likely inaccurate, incomplete, or 
of questionable value.28  Finally, in other situations, 
a  data  problem  was  unobservable,  such  as  when 
accounts were unreported or inconsistently reported. 
In these situations, we could identify only the poten­
tial effect on credit history scores of correcting the 
problem but not the proportion of people affected. 
We  conducted  ﬁfteen  simulations:  three  that 
addressed issues related to stale credit accounts, four 
that pertained to nonreported credit account informa­
tion, and eight that addressed data quality issues for 
collection agency accounts, public record items, and 
creditor inquiries. 
Stale Accounts Last Reported as Paid as Agreed 
or as Minor Delinquencies 
Recognizing the prevalence of stale accounts in credit 
records,  most  credit-scoring  modelers  apply  stale-
28.  In  the  case  of  stale  accounts,  the  information  was  clearly 
outdated. In the case of inquiries, the information was incomplete in 
that we could not determine whether the inquiries were associated 
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account  rules  to  such  accounts  when  they  develop 
credit  evaluation  models.  For  credit  accounts  that 
have never been in major derogatory status (paid-as-
agreed accounts or accounts with only minor delin­
quencies recorded), the rules typically retain the his­
toric information on payment performance but dictate 
that certain accounts that have gone unreported for an 
extended period no longer have balances outstanding. 
Any balances shown at last report for these accounts 
are reset to zero. 
In  reverse-engineering  the  factors  used  in  this 
analysis,  we  discovered  that  the  credit-reporting 
agency  had  imposed  a  one-year  stale-account  rule 
when it created most factors related to paid-as-agreed 
accounts and to accounts with only minor delinquen­
cies. Our simulation examined the effects on these 
accounts of a more-aggressive stale-account rule, one 
that redeﬁned stale accounts on the basis of a three-
month period for current reporting.29 
Stale Accounts with Major Derogatories 
Some  stale  accounts  were  last  reported  in  major 
derogatory status. Here the payment status was more 
likely to have remained the same since the last report 
than it was in the case of stale accounts that were 
paid as agreed or showed only minor delinquencies 
at  last  report.  Many  seriously  delinquent  accounts 
can remain in that state for an extended period with 
no change in status (and thus the account information 
need  not  be  updated).  However,  in  several  situa­
tions, the reported account status is likely to be no 
longer accurate, such as when a consumer has taken 
out a new mortgage after the date on which the stale 
major  derogatory  was  last  reported.  Generally,  a 
mortgage  lender  will  not  extend  a  new  loan  until 
a  consumer  pays  off  (or  otherwise  addresses)  all 
major  derogatories.  Another  situation  in  which  the 
reported  account  status  is  likely  to  be  inaccurate 
is when the account creditor no longer reports about 
any individuals. In this case, the account has prob­
ably been paid off or transferred. 
We evaluated the effect of non-updating of credit 
account information in these situations by treating as 
paid off all stale major derogatories for which (1) the 
consumer  had  taken  out  a  new  mortgage  after  the 
date on which the major derogatory was last reported 
29.  Analysis of the patterns of veriﬁcation showed that the vast 
majority of open accounts were veriﬁed by the reporter every month 
or two. Thus, in choosing a three-month rule, we simulated the effect 
of a maximally aggressive stale-account rule on the likely inaccuracy 
associated with the account information. We had no obvious way of 
simulating the effect of lengthening the time period. 
or (2) the creditor for the derogatory account had not 
reported information on any consumer within three 
months of the date on which the sample was drawn. 
The credit-reporting agency had imposed a one-year 
stale-account rule when it created factors related to 
major  derogatory  accounts.  The  rule  implied  that 
paying off a major derogatory account that had not 
been reported within a year generally would have no 
effect on an individual’s credit history score. Thus, 
we again restricted our analysis of the effect of stale 
accounts to those that had last been reported three to 
twelve months before the date on which the sample 
was drawn. 
Failure of Some Subprime Creditors to Report 
Accounts 
As a potential source of data inaccuracy, the failure 
of some subprime creditors (lenders that specialize 
in loans for high-risk individuals) to report accounts 
differs  from  the  others  studied  here  in  that  non-
reporting  is  by  deﬁnition  unobservable.  Conse­
quently, the task for researchers is conceptually more 
difﬁcult,  and  simulations  cannot  address  the  inci­
dence of such nonreporting. To simulate the potential 
effect of such creditor behavior, we chose a random, 
never-delinquent mortgage, installment, or revolving 
account at a subprime lender for each individual with 
such an account and rescored the individual as if the 
account had not been reported. We deﬁned subprime 
lenders as those that were reporting credit accounts as 
of the date the sample was drawn and for which more 
than one-half of their customers in the sample had 
credit history scores in the high-risk range (a score 
below 600). 
Failure of the Largest Student Loan Creditor to 
Report Any Accounts 
As noted above, in 2003 Sallie Mae stopped report­
ing information on its accounts to two of the three 
largest  credit-reporting  agencies.  Moreover,  Sallie 
Mae  asked  that  the  agencies  suppress  all  historic 
information  on  the  accounts  it  had  previously 
reported.  By  the  time  the  Federal  Reserve  sample 
was drawn, Sallie Mae had reversed its initial deci­
sion.  Our  sample  omits  information  that  would 
allow us to identify Sallie Mae speciﬁcally. Thus, to 
approximate the potential effect of Sallie Mae’s origi­
nal decision, we deleted information on the loans of 
random student-loan lenders—representing approxi­
mately the same number of student loans that Sallie Credit Report Accuracy and Access to Credit  311 
Mae  stopped  reporting—from  the  credit  records 
in the Federal Reserve sample, and we rescored the 
affected individuals. 
Failure of Some Creditors to Report Minor 
Delinquencies 
Our  review  of  the  sample  indicates  that  a  small 
percentage  of  lenders  fail  to  report  that  paid-as-
agreed accounts have become minor delinquencies. 
Rather,  the  lenders  report  the  accounts  as  paid  as 
agreed until the accounts become major derogatories. 
To simulate the potential effects of unreported minor 
delinquencies,  for  each  individual  we  randomly 
selected a currently reported account that was not in 
major derogatory status, was associated with a lender 
that  did  report  minor  delinquencies  for  each  indi­
vidual, and had been thirty or sixty days delinquent 
at least once. We assigned ‘‘paying as agreed’’  per­
formance status to each thirty- and sixty-day delin­
quency in the selected account’s performance record. 
This  adjustment  replicates  what  the  credit  record 
would  show  for  a  lender  that  reported  thirty- and 
sixty-day minor delinquencies to be paid as agreed. 
Failure of Some Creditors to Report Credit Limits 
on Revolving Accounts 
As  noted,  about  14  percent  of  revolving  credit 
accounts  were  reported  without  information  about 
credit  limits,  affecting  roughly  46  percent  of  the 
individuals in the Federal Reserve sample. Therefore, 
credit  evaluators  must  use  other  means  to  derive 
credit utilization rates for these individuals. The most 
common approach (and the one that model develop­
ers customarily use for credit-risk factors) is to substi­
tute the highest balance for the missing credit limit; 
the typical result is higher calculated utilization rates 
than if the credit limits had been reported. 
We  simulated  the  effects  of  the  nonreporting  of 
credit limits on individuals by creating an estimated 
credit  limit  for  each  revolving  account  without  a 
reported limit. Because information on the true credit 
limit in these cases was missing, the simulation in 
effect  compared  our  method  of  calculating  credit 
utilization  rates  with  that  of  the  credit-reporting 
agency. The primary difference between the two esti­
mation procedures is that our approach is statistically 
unbiased, whereas the agency’s method, which relies 
on  the  highest-balance  amount,  tends  to  be  biased 
upward.  That  is,  our  estimates  reﬂect  the  ‘‘best 
guess’’  for  the  missing  credit  limit  based  on  other 
information in the individual’s credit record. Speciﬁ­
cally,  we  used  samples  of  accounts  of  individuals 
with reported credit limits to estimate a regression 
model that predicted the credit limits for revolving 
accounts with missing limits.30 
Duplications in Collection Agency Accounts 
A review of the sample credit records suggests that 
some collection agency accounts may be duplicated. 
Duplication can occur because of changed account 
numbers or transfers of accounts from one collection 
agency to another. To address the potential effects of 
this problem, we conducted simulations that consoli­
dated  likely  duplicated  collection  account  records 
into single items. We identiﬁed simulated duplicates 
in two ways. One procedure was to match the collec­
tion  amount  and  the  identity  of  the  creditor  when 
one account was reported paid and the other unpaid. 
The second procedure was to identify likely account 
transfers that were not reported as such to the credit-
reporting agencies. 
Additional  duplicate  collection  agency  accounts 
likely exist in the data but are difﬁcult to identify. For 
example, accounts that match on collection amount 
and  identity  of  the  original  creditor  but  that  are 
reported by a single agency with reporting dates that 
are close in time may be duplicates, but they may just 
as likely result from repeated missed payments of the 
same  amount.  Accounts  that  match  on  identity  of 
the original creditor and are spaced apart in time but 
do not match on amount could indicate a new report 
ﬁled after a partial payment was received, in which 
case they would involve duplication. Alternatively, 
they could reﬂect separate incidents of missed pay­
ments with the same creditor. 
Inconsistent Reporting of Small Collection Agency 
Accounts 
Analysis of collection accounts reveals that many are 
for  very  small  amounts  that  may  be  inconsistently 
reported.  Recognizing  this  possibility,  some  credit 
evaluators  choose  to  exclude  small  collection 
accounts from credit evaluations. To test the effect 
of inconsistently reported small collection items on 
30.  Independent factors used in the estimation included outstand­
ing balance and highest-balance level, the age and type of account, the 
type of lender, balances and limits on other accounts, and payment 
performance information. The resulting distribution of estimated credit 
limits and utilization for accounts with imputed limits was virtually 
identical to the distribution of accounts with reported limits within the 
population, an indication that missing limits are primarily a function 
of the lender and are almost always unrelated to the characteristics of 
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credit  history  scores,  we  removed  all  collection 
records involving items under $100 from the credit 
records. 
Medical Collection Items 
Some  credit  evaluators  report  that  they  remove 
collection  accounts  related  to  medical  services 
from credit evaluations because such accounts often 
involve disputes with insurance companies over lia­
bility for the accounts or because the accounts may 
not indicate future performance on loans. Unfortu­
nately, evaluators must use manual overrides based 
on the creditors’ identities to remove medical collec­
tion accounts because the credit record data lack a 
code identifying claims associated with medical ser­
vices. The absence of a code means that this process 
cannot  be  used  in  automated  calculations  of  credit 
history scores. To test the potential effect of including 
medical collection items in the calculation of credit 
history  scores,  we  developed  a  medical  collection 
code  based  on  an  inspection  of  the  creditor  name, 
and we used the code to identify medical collection 
accounts  to  drop  from  the  credit  history  score 
calculation (as noted earlier, as of this writing, at least 
one  of  the  agencies  had  developed  such  a  code, 
potentially reducing the relevance of this simulation). 
Potentially Misassigned Collection Agency 
Accounts 
Most (72 percent) of the individuals in the sample 
with a non-credit-related collection agency account 
also  had  a  credit-related  major  derogatory.  About 
45  percent  of  those  individuals  with  information 
reported by a single collection agency had no credit-
related  major  derogatories.  In  contrast,  only  about 
15  percent  of  those  with  information  reported  by 
more than one collection agency had no credit-related 
major derogatories. These patterns suggest that mis­
assigned  collection  agency  accounts  may  be  more 
common among those with information reported by a 
single collection agency. We simulated the effects of 
correcting such misassigned collections by dropping 
the collection accounts of individuals who had infor­
mation reported by one collection agency but had no 
credit-related major derogatories. 
Duplications in Public Records 
As with our analysis of collection agency accounts, 
our  review  of  the  sample  public  record  reports 
suggests  that  some  records  may  be  duplicated.  To 
address  the  potential  effects  of  this  problem,  we 
conducted simulations that removed likely duplicates 
of public record items. We identiﬁed duplicates by 
matches  on  the  recording  date,  amount  owed,  and 
creditor. In many instances, the duplicates involved 
the original ﬁling of a judgment or lien, which was 
followed by a record of a paid judgment or lien with 
all information identical to that in the ﬁrst record. In 
other  instances,  second  or  third  ﬁlings  may  have 
ended  up  as  duplicates  with  the  same  (or  almost 
identical) information. 
Inconsistent Reporting of Lawsuits and Dismissed 
Items in Public Records 
As noted earlier, our analysis of credit record ﬁles in 
the Federal Reserve sample suggests that lawsuits are 
inconsistently included in the credit-reporting agency 
ﬁles. An additional issue concerns the inclusion in 
the public records of dismissed liens, judgments, or 
suits, which may be of questionable value for predict­
ing  credit  performance.  To  simulate  the  potential 
effects of including these items in the calculation of 
credit  history  scores,  we  removed  all  lawsuits  and 
dismissals from the credit records of individuals with 
such items. 
Failure to Consolidate Multiple Inquiries 
for the Same Loan 
Analysts have cautioned that simple counts of inquir­
ies in scoring models may unfairly penalize consum­
ers  who  shop  for  credit.  However,  the  information 
needed  to  help  distinguish  consumers  shopping  to 
obtain  a  single  loan  from  those  seeking  to  obtain 
multiple  loans  is  generally  not  available  in  credit 
records because of incomplete reporting of the type 
of inquiry. 
To simulate the potential magnitude of the effect of 
incomplete reporting of the type of inquiry, we con­
ducted two experiments. First, we identiﬁed all indi­
viduals in the sample who had taken out a mortgage 
or an auto loan in the two years before the sample 
was drawn. For each loan type, we consolidated into 
a  single  inquiry  the  multiple  inquiries  that  had 
occurred in the two-month period preceding the date 
on which the loan was opened (if any non-auto or 
non-mortgage loans were also taken out during this 
period,  we  did  not  consolidate  any  inquiries).  The 
second  simulation  was  somewhat  broader.  We 
divided all inquiries into three groups based on the 
type  of  inquirer  as  a  proxy  for  the  likelihood  that Credit Report Accuracy and Access to Credit  313 
the  consumer  was  shopping  for  a  single  loan  or 
potentially ‘‘bulking up on credit.’’  The ﬁrst group 
represented inquiries that were unlikely to be credit-
related,  including  inquiries  from  insurance  compa­
nies,  utilities,  and  collection  agencies.  The  second 
group  involved  inquiries  likely  related  to  the  pur­
chase of a single large item, such as inquiries from 
auto companies or real estate ﬁrms. We put all other 
inquiries in the third group. Inquiries from the ﬁrst 
group were dropped in the simulation because they 
did not appear to be credit related. For the second 
group,  we  consolidated  all  inquiries  within  a  two-
week  period  into  a  single  inquiry.  Only  inquiries 
from the third group were left unchanged. 
Analyzing the Populations of Interest 
Each of the data quality issues that we focus on may 
have different implications for different individuals 
depending on the individuals’ credit characteristics. 
For example, the effect of a missing credit limit will 
be  different  for  individuals  who  have  many  open 
revolving  accounts  than  for  those  who  have  few. 
Therefore, we also examined the effect of these data 
quality  issues  for  three  subpopulations  of  interest. 
Because data quality problems are less likely to affect 
the access to credit of individuals with relatively high 
credit  history  scores,  we  divided  the  analysis  pop­
ulation (the same one used to estimate the approxi­
mated model) into categories based on credit history 
score.  We  also  categorized  the  analysis  population 
by depth of credit ﬁle and by selected demographic 
characteristics. 
For the analysis by credit history scores, we sorted 
individuals  into  one  of  three  risk  groups  based  on 
their  proprietary  credit-risk  scores.  The  ﬁrst  group 
included individuals whose scores were 661 or above 
(74  percent  of  the  sample  population),  the  second 
group included individuals with scores between 600 
and  660  (13  percent  of  the  sample),  and  the  third 
group included individuals whose scores were below 
600 (13 percent of the sample).31 
31.  Individuals  with  credit  scores  above  660  have  scores  sufﬁ­
ciently high that they are likely to qualify for the lowest interest rates 
available on loans, and individuals with scores below 600 have scores 
sufﬁciently  low  that  they  are  likely  to  be  denied  credit  or  to  pay 
substantially higher rates than those charged to better-qualiﬁed bor­
rowers. Individuals in the middle category have scores that place them 
at the margin. 
The credit history score ranges used here are not immutable; in 
practice, the bounds of these ranges vary somewhat by loan product 
and by the appetite for risk of individual market participants. More-
over, credit history is only one factor considered in credit underwrit­
ing, although an important one, and so a low credit history score may 
be offset by, for example, a low debt-to-income ratio, a signiﬁcant 
down payment, collateral, or potential for strong future earnings. 
2.	 Distribution of individuals, by credit history score and 
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Below 550  550–600  601–660  661–700  701 and above 
Credit history score 
Less than 10 
10–80 
More than 80 
Note.  See note to chart 1. Income categories are deﬁned as follows: low or 
moderate, less than 80 percent of the median family income of individual’s 
metropolitan statistical area (MSA) or of nonmetropolitan portion of individu­
al’s state; middle, 80–119 percent of the median family income of individual’s 
MSA or of nonmetropolitan portion of individual’s state; high, 120 percent or 
more of the median family income of individual’s MSA or of nonmetropolitan 
portion of individual’s state. 
For the analysis by depth of credit ﬁle, we sorted 
individuals with records of credit accounts into two 
groups  based  on  the  number  of  credit  accounts  in 
their credit records. One group consisted of individu­
als with ‘‘thin ﬁles’’—that is, ﬁles with fewer than 
four credit accounts. The second group consisted of 
all other individuals. Individuals with thin ﬁles, who 314  Federal Reserve Bulletin  Summer 2004 
accounted  for  about  19  percent  of  the  sample,  are 
an important segment of the population to examine 
because their credit history scores may exhibit rela­
tively  greater  sensitivity  to  data  problems.  A  data 
problem affecting a particular account may be more 
likely to have a substantial effect on the credit history 
score of an individual with a thin ﬁle because of a 
lack of information from other accounts that could 
dilute the effect of the problem. 
For  the  other  analyses,  we  investigated  whether 
different  patterns  emerge  when  individuals  are 
grouped by age, relative income of census tract of 
residence,  and  percentage  of  minorities  in  census 
tract  of  residence.  Such  segmentation  allows  us  to 
determine whether issues of data accuracy and com­
pleteness likely affect various subgroups of the popu­
lation  in  different  ways.  For  example,  residents  of 
higher-income census tracts may, on average, have 
more  revolving  accounts  than  residents  of  lower-
income areas and therefore may face a greater prob­
ability  of  encountering  a  missing  credit  limit.  We 
report the distribution of proprietary credit-risk scores 
for these various subgroups (chart 2).32  In general, 
younger individuals, those who live in lower-income 
areas, and those who live in areas with high minority 
populations have lower scores. 
RESULTS 
First, we report the proportion of individuals who are 
affected by a simulated change in (correction to) the 
credit records—that is, the proportion subject to the 
data quality issue in question (table 3). Second, we 
report  the  proportion  among  those  affected  by  the 
simulated change in credit records for which the net 
effect on approximated credit history scores was zero. 
Third,  we  report  the  proportions  of  individuals 
among  those  affected  by  the  simulated  change  for 
which  approximated  credit  history  scores  changed 
32.  Scores in chart 2 are somewhat higher than scores for individu­
als in the simulation samples, which exclude individuals who have 
had bankruptcies. 
3.	 Estimated effects of data ‘‘corrections’’ on the credit history scores of individuals, by data problem corrected 
Percent except as noted 
Data problem corrected  Individuals 
affected 
Distribution of individuals affected  Memo 
Effect on credit history score 
Total 
Mean change in points 
No change 







in score 1–9 points  10 or more 
points  1–9 points  10 or more 
points 
Involving credit accounts 
Failure to close a 
Paid-as-agreed account  ..............  12.9  10.9  27.0  8.1  48.7  5.2  100.0  −8.1  4.4 
Minor delinquent account ............  1.3  4.5  20.0  17.8  43.1  14.5  100.0  −12.6  8.6 
Major derogatory account ............  4.7  82.3  9.2  .3  8.2  .0  100.0  −1.9  1.2 
Failure of a subprime lender to report 
a paid-as-agreed account  ..........  n.c.  28.5  41.0  8.9  17.9  3.7  100.0  −6.0  6.2 
Failure of largest student loan 
creditor to report ..................  3.5  16.1  45.0  13.1  21.5  4.4  100.0  −7.0  7.5 
Failure to report a 
Minor delinquency  ..................  n.c.  15.1  39.3  20.8  22.4  2.4  100.0  −11.0  4.0 
Credit limit  .........................  33.0  31.7  1.7  .0  53.3  13.3  100.0  −1.4  6.1 
Involving collection agency accounts 
Failure to eliminate duplicate 
collection agency accounts  ........  1.2  6.8  1.1  .0  67.4  24.7  100.0  −1.4  8.5 
Reporting of 
Collection agency accounts 
under $100 .....................  11.1  41.2  7.0  1.2  41.7  8.9  100.0  −4.3  5.8 
Medical collection accounts ..........  15.5  11.8  5.4  1.5  49.6  31.6  100.0  −5.9  11.2 
Potentially misassigned collection 
accounts  .......................  8.2  12.8  9.0  3.4  42.8  31.9  100.0  −6.9  13.4 
Involving public records 
Reporting of duplicate public records  . . .  .4  38.6  1.9  .0  59.4  .1  100.0  −1.9  1.3 
Inclusion of lawsuits and dismissals .....  1.1  18.5  3.8  1.0  53.1  23.6  100.0  −5.9  9.1 
Involving creditor inquiries 
Failure to consolidate 
Multiple inquiries for auto and 
mortgage loans  .................  3.7  16.8  8.3  .5  73.8  .7  100.0  −2.9  2.3 
Other multiple inquiries ..............  14.6  5.2  4.9  .1  85.4  4.4  100.0  −2.3  4.2 
Note.  The table reports the effect of ‘‘correcting’’  a data problem. Individu- n.c.  Not calculable. 
als whose scores increase because of a correction would be better off if the 
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materially—that is, increased or decreased 10 or more 
points.  These  calculations  provide  insight  into  the 
proportion of consumers who may or may not face 
a change in credit terms (either a higher or a lower 
interest rate) or who may be unable to gain access 
to credit because of the particular data problem. Also, 
to provide another basis for determining how much 
variation  in  credit  history  scores  may  occur  when 
simulated corrections are made to individuals’ credit 
records, we present the overall mean change in credit 
history scores for the individuals who were materi­
ally  affected.  Because  the  hypothesized  correction 
may increase or decrease an individual’s credit his-
tory score depending on the nature of the problem 
and the composition of the individual’s credit record, 
the mean change for individuals with a decrease in 
score and the mean change for those with an increase 
in score are shown separately. 
For each simulation, the overall effect of a simu­
lated change on an individual can be either positive 
or negative. Some of the effect is undoubtedly due 
to  imprecision  in  our  approximation  of  the  credit-
scoring model or to consumers’ being shifted from 
one ‘‘scorecard’’ to another. However, we believe the 
results mainly reﬂect the complexity of interactions 
among the various factors that produce a credit his-
tory score. For example, a failure to report a paid-
as-agreed  account  as  closed  can  help  individuals 
with few active and paid-as-agreed credit accounts 
but can hurt individuals with a substantial number of 
accounts that have high balances and utilization rates. 
Effects of Stale Accounts 
The ﬁrst group of simulations presented in the table 
involved  hypothetical  corrections  to  selected  credit 
account records. The ﬁrst three of these pertained to 
the use of a more aggressive stale-account rule that 
designated  accounts  as  stale  after  three  months  of 
nonreporting and treated the accounts as being closed 
and  having  a  zero  balance.  Several  conclusions 
emerged from these simulations. On the one hand, a 
signiﬁcant proportion of consumers appeared to be 
subject  to  stale  credit  account  issues.  Almost  one-
ﬁfth of the individuals in the Federal Reserve sample 
had at least one stale credit account as deﬁned by the 
assumptions  of  the  ﬁrst  three  simulations.  Further, 
21 percent of the individuals with stale major deroga­
tories (percentage not shown in table) had at least one 
account that met the conditions of the third simula­
tion and thus had potentially been paid off. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  application  of  the  more 
aggressive stale-account rule appeared to have only 
a modest effect on the credit history scores of these 
individuals. Our simulations suggest that more than 
80 percent of the individuals with stale major deroga­
tories  would  have  shown  no  change  in  score  if 
they  had  paid  off  the  account  the  month  after  the 
date  on  which  the  lender  last  reported  it  and  the 
lender had reported the payoff to the credit-reporting 
agency. The effect of paying off accounts was some-
what larger for paid-as-agreed accounts and for those 
with minor delinquencies, but even here most con­
sumers  showed  changes  of  fewer  than  10  points. 
One likely explanation for the relatively minor effect 
of the corrections on individuals is the large num­
ber  of  credit  accounts  in  the  typical  consumer’s 
ﬁle.  For  example,  consumers  with  a  stale  paid-as-
agreed  account  had,  on  average,  almost  sixteen 
credit accounts, and 90 percent of these consumers 
had at least ﬁve. 
Many of the credit-risk factors reﬂect ‘‘extreme’’ 
values such as the age of the oldest account or the 
number of months since the most-recent delinquency. 
These factors will change as the result of a correc­
tion only if the affected account is the ‘‘marginal’’ 
account—for example, the oldest or the most recently 
delinquent.  Moreover,  although  factors  reﬂecting 
sums,  such  as  total  balances,  will  be  sensitive  to 
changes in any account, the effect of the change will 
be reduced if many other accounts contribute to the 
factor. Another explanation for the relatively minor 
effects  of  the  corrections  for  stale  accounts  prob­
ably  lies  in  the  rules  used  to  calculate  the  factors 
employed by credit modelers. For example, modelers 
appear to place little weight on outstanding balances 
for major derogatory accounts, perhaps recognizing 
the inconsistency in the reporting of account payoffs. 
Thus, when payoffs are recorded, the effect on scores 
is minimal. 
Effects of Unreported Credit Account 
Information 
We  conducted  an  additional  four  simulations  for 
data  problems  in  credit  accounts.  The  simulations 
addressed the nonreporting of certain categories of 
accounts  (paid-as-agreed  accounts  of  a  subprime 
lender and accounts of the largest student loan credi­
tor) and of certain types of information (minor delin­
quencies and credit limits). 
We could not determine the incidence of subprime 
creditors’  failure  to  report  paid-as-agreed  credit 
accounts. By our estimates, Sallie Mae’s failure to 
report loans affected less than 4 percent of individu­
als. Nonreporting of these types of accounts appeared 316  Federal Reserve Bulletin  Summer 2004 
4.	 Estimated effects of data ‘‘corrections’’ on the credit history scores of individuals, by data problem corrected, 
for selected credit history score ranges 
Percent except as noted 
Data problem corrected  Individuals 
affected 
Distribution of individuals affected  Memo 
Effect on credit history score 
Total 
Mean change in points 
No change 







in score 1–9 points  10 or more 
points  1–9 points  10 or more 
points 
Individuals with credit history scores above 660 
Involving credit accounts 
Failure to close a 
Paid-as-agreed account  ..............  13.6  11.3  22.0  4.7  55.8  6.2  100.0  −6.1  4.5 
Minor delinquent account ............  .2  3.1  19.2  52.9  21.7  3.1  100.0  −20.2  5.0 
Major derogatory account ............  1.2  89.1  6.1  .2  4.6  .0  100.0  −1.8  1.0 
Failure of a subprime lender to report 
a paid-as-agreed account  ..........  n.c.  45.5  30.1  2.8  20.3  1.3  100.0  −4.3  3.0 
Failure of largest student loan 
creditor to report ..................  3.2  19.3  50.4  9.7  19.3  1.3  100.0  −6.1  3.8 
Failure to report a 
Minor delinquency  ..................  n.c.  19.6  45.7  20.0  14.2  .6  100.0  −9.3  3.0 
Credit limit  .........................  35.8  34.8  1.4  .0  54.1  9.7  100.0  −1.1  5.1 
Involving collection agency accounts 
Failure to eliminate duplicate 
collection agency accounts  ........  .1  11.7  .4  .0  81.4  6.6  100.0  −1.0  4.6 
Reporting of 
Collection agency accounts 
under $100 .....................  3.6  21.8  9.3  2.7  42.8  23.4  100.0  −5.8  10.6 
Medical collection accounts ..........  6.5  5.2  8.0  2.9  35.7  48.3  100.0  −6.8  16.6 
Potentially misassigned collection 
accounts  .......................  5.4  4.7  11.0  4.4  31.4  48.6  100.0  −1.6  6.4 
Involving public records 
Reporting of duplicate public records  . . .  .2  39.1  2.3  .0  58.6  .0  100.0  −1.0  1.1 
Inclusion of lawsuits and dismissals .....  .7  19.2  5.0  1.7  45.5  28.7  100.0  −7.0  10.8 
Involving creditor inquiries 
Failure to consolidate 
Multiple inquiries for auto and 
mortgage loans  .................  3.4  10.9  3.8  .0  84.7  .7  100.0  −1.6  2.3 
Other multiple inquiries ..............  12.2  3.1  1.4  .0  94.0  1.5  100.0  −1.4  3.6 
Individuals with credit history scores between 600 and 660 
Involving credit accounts 
Failure to close a 
Paid-as-agreed account  ..............  12.1  11.0  49.4  13.0  25.4  1.3  100.0  −6.4  3.3 
Minor delinquent account ............  2.6  4.0  27.2  22.6  41.7  4.6  100.0  −11.9  4.9 
Major derogatory account ............  10.2  87.9  6.4  .1  5.7  .0  100.0  −1.7  1.3 
Failure of a subprime lender to report 
a paid-as-agreed account  ..........  n.c.  22.2  48.6  6.4  19.4  3.5  100.0  −4.2  4.9 
Failure of largest student loan 
creditor to report ..................  3.8  8.1  33.7  17.6  33.0  7.6  100.0  −9.5  6.0 
Failure to report a 
Minor delinquency  ..................  n.c.  11.0  33.1  21.5  31.2  3.2  100.0  −11.7  3.7 
Credit limit  .........................  28.4  14.4  2.3  .0  57.2  26.1  100.0  −1.8  7.8 
Involving collection agency accounts 
Failure to eliminate duplicate 
collection agency accounts  ........  3.0  8.6  .8  .0  80.7  9.9  100.0  −1.0  5.3 
Reporting of 
Collection agency accounts 
under $100 .....................  28.1  43.6  5.7  1.2  42.7  6.9  100.0  −5.1  4.4 
Medical collection accounts ..........  38.8  11.1  4.4  1.7  56.5  26.4  100.0  −7.2  9.2 
Potentially misassigned collection 
accounts  .......................  11.8  18.1  9.7  6.9  48.1  17.2  100.0  −9.8  9.6 
Involving public records 
Reporting of duplicate public records  . . .  .7  44.3  1.0  .0  54.7  .0  100.0  −1.0  1.1 
Inclusion of lawsuits and dismissals .....  2.1  20.8  2.2  .2  62.2  14.7  100.0  −4.2  6.4 
Involving creditor inquiries 
Failure to consolidate 
Multiple inquiries for auto and 
mortgage loans  .................  5.0  32.7  15.1  .1  51.6  .6  100.0  −1.9  2.0 
Other multiple inquiries ..............  17.0  10.0  7.8  .0  80.9  1.3  100.0  −1.5  3.9 Credit Report Accuracy and Access to Credit  317 
4.—Continued 
Data problem corrected  Individuals 
affected 
Distribution of individuals affected  Memo 
Effect on credit history score 
Total 
Mean change in points 
No change 







in score 1–9 points  10 or more 
points  1–9 points  10 or more 
points 
Individuals with credit history scores below 600 
Involving credit accounts 
Failure to close a 
Paid-as-agreed account  ..............  9.1  7.0  46.0  35.8  10.4  .8  100.0  −16.8  3.3 
Minor delinquent account ............  7.1  5.0  17.3  9.9  47.4  20.4  100.0  −9.7  9.8 
Major derogatory account ............  22.9  77.3  11.7  .4  10.6  .1  100.0  −2.0  1.3 
Failure of a subprime lender to report 
a paid-as-agreed account  ..........  n.c.  7.2  52.4  19.8  13.1  7.6  100.0  −8.1  12.4 
Failure of largest student loan 
creditor to report ..................  4.8  8.5  30.0  24.7  21.3  15.7  100.0  −13.1  16.1 
Failure to report a 
Minor delinquency  ..................  n.c.  5.8  26.0  22.7  38.5  7.0  100.0  −17.0  5.3 
Credit limit  .........................  19.3  19.9  4.2  .1  37.7  38.1  100.0  −1.9  13.1 
Involving collection agency accounts 
Failure to eliminate duplicate 
collection agency accounts  ........  6.8  5.2  1.4  .0  58.9  34.6  100.0  −1.5  10.6 
Reporting of 
Collection agency accounts 
under $100 .....................  43.2  50.7  6.7  .3  40.4  2.0  100.0  −2.4  2.6 
Medical collection accounts ..........  51.6  18.0  4.1  .2  55.9  21.7  100.0  −2.7  8.0 
Potentially misassigned collection 
accounts  .......................  23.5  22.6  5.7  .1  57.8  13.9  100.0  −1.6  6.4 
Involving public records 
Reporting of duplicate public records  . . .  1.0  34.1  1.8  .0  63.7  .4  100.0  −3.8  1.8 
Inclusion of lawsuits and dismissals .....  2.6  15.1  3.1  .3  59.8  21.7  100.0  −2.5  8.5 
Involving creditor inquiries 
Failure to consolidate 
Multiple inquiries for auto and 
mortgage loans  .................  4.3  27.7  23.5  3.7  44.4  .8  100.0  −4.6  2.2 
Other multiple inquiries ..............  28.2  8.5  13.1  .6  62.9  14.9  100.0  −2.9  6.5 
Note.  See note to table 3. 
to  have  only  a  modest  effect  on  the  credit  history 
scores of affected individuals. For example, the sim­
ulation  results  indicate  that  if  nonreporting  by  a 
subprime lender or by Sallie Mae had been corrected, 
in each case less than 5 percent of affected individu­
als would have gained 10 percentage points or more 
in their credit history scores. Moreover, such nonre­
porting may help or hurt the individuals. For exam­
ple, the simulations suggest that, on average, consum­
ers were helped by Sallie Mae’s not reporting their 
loans, a somewhat surprising result. Fifty-eight per-
cent of affected individuals would have experienced 
decreases in their credit history scores if the accounts 
had  been  reported.  However,  the  median  number 
of  credit  accounts  for  individuals  with  a  corrected 
student loan account was twenty-two, a ﬁgure well 
above  average  for  all  individuals.  Thus,  the  posi­
tive effects on credit history scores of reducing indi­
n.c.  Not calculable. 
viduals’ outstanding balances by not reporting their 
student  loans  may  have  outweighed  the  negative 
effects of eliminating one additional paid-as-agreed 
account. 
We  also  could  not  determine  the  proportion  of 
individuals  affected  by  creditors’  suppression  of 
minor delinquencies; however, we could estimate the 
impact  of  the  suppression  on  affected  individuals. 
The  simulation  suggests  that  when  suppression 
occurs,  it  is  likely  to  improve  the  credit  history 
scores of many affected individuals by a signiﬁcant 
amount. 
Effects of Unreported Credit Limits 
Nonreporting  of  credit  limits  affects  a  substantial 
number of individuals (33 percent of the individuals 318  Federal Reserve Bulletin  Summer 2004 
in the simulations), but the effect tends to be small. 
The likely reason for this result is that affected indi­
viduals tend to have a large number of credit accounts 
in their credit records (eighteen on average), while 
the  frequency  of  accounts  missing  limits  is  low. 
Thus,  accounts  with  missing  limits  tend  to  have 
a  small  effect  on  the  overall  utilization  rates  of 
individuals. 
Unlike the results in most of the other simulations, 
the  effects  of  missing  credit  limits  were  predomi­
nantly  in  one  direction—most  affected  individuals’ 
scores would have likely been higher if missing credit 
limits had been reported. This ﬁnding suggests that 
the  rule  that  credit  modelers  typically  adopt  for 
addressing  missing  limits—use  of  the  reported 
highest-balance amount—is likely biased. To further 
test this conjecture, we examined credit accounts for 
which the credit limit was reported and compared the 
actual limit with the estimated limit that credit model­
ers  would  have  applied  if  the  limit  had  not  been 
reported.  On  average,  the  rule  that  the  credit-
reporting agencies used when they constructed utili­
zation rates would imply a credit limit of less than 
one-half  the  actual  limit.  The  rule  would  imply  a 
lower  credit  limit  than  the  actual  limit  in  about 
90 percent of the cases. In contrast, our rule, as noted 
earlier, was statistically unbiased. 
Effects of Problems with Collection Agency 
Accounts, Public Records, and Creditor 
Inquiries 
Results  for  eight  simulations  involving  collection 
agency accounts, public records, and creditor inquir­
ies were varied. 
Collection Agency Accounts 
The  proportion  of  individuals  affected  by  potential 
data problems or inconsistencies in reporting by col­
lection agencies ranged from 16 percent for reporting 
of medical collection items to only about 1 percent 
for duplication of collection items, although, as noted, 
our ability to detect such duplications was limited. 
However, the effect of corrections on affected indi­
viduals tended to be large, particularly in comparison 
with simulated problems in credit accounts, and was 
generally associated with increases in credit history 
scores.  For  example,  for  three  of  the  four  collec­
tion account simulations, one-fourth or more of the 
affected  individuals  showed  increases  of  10  points 
or more in their scores. These results illustrate that 
collection  accounts  weigh  heavily  in  the  scoring 
model and that most individuals have relatively few 
such  accounts  and  thus  are  affected  more  signiﬁ­
cantly when a problem occurs in any given account. 
Public Records 
Both simulations that addressed potential data prob­
lems  or  inconsistencies  in  public  records  indicated 
that the proportion of individuals affected was small 
(1 percent or less). However, the effects of the correc­
tions differed signiﬁcantly between the two simula­
tions.  In  the  simulation  involving  duplicate  public 
record items, less than 1 percent of affected individu­
als experienced increases in their credit history scores 
of  10  points  or  more,  whereas  in  the  simulation 
involving lawsuits and dismissals, nearly one-fourth 
of affected individuals did so. This dichotomy reﬂects 
an  important  distinction  between  duplicate  public 
records and lawsuits and dismissals. Whereas remov­
ing a lawsuit or a dismissal may completely eliminate 
adverse  public  record  items  from  an  individual’s 
credit record, eliminating a duplicate record cannot 
do so. 
Creditor Inquiries 
The simulation that consolidated inquiries related to 
auto and mortgage loans affected only 4 percent of 
individuals in the sample; the broader consolidation 
simulation affected about 15 percent of individuals. 
In  both  cases,  the  size  of  the  effect  was  modest 
and almost always resulted in a higher score. Only a 
small percentage of individuals experienced increases 
in their scores of more than 10 points. 
Differences across Subpopulations 
Individuals with scores below 600 tended to have the 
highest frequency of data problems, and those with 
scores above 660 had the lowest incidence (table 4). 
Two exceptions to this pattern occurred in the simu­
lations  involving  the  failure  to  close  stale  paid-as-
agreed  accounts  and  the  failure  to  report  a  credit 
limit.  Here  individuals  in  the  highest  score  range 
showed the largest incidence of data problems pri­
marily  because  they  tended  to  have  more  credit 
accounts. Signiﬁcant differences were also apparent 
in  the  impact  of  simulated  corrections  on  affected 
individuals across the three groups. Generally, indi­
viduals with scores below 600 were the most likely to 
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5.	 Estimated effects of data ‘‘corrections’’ on the credit history scores of individuals with ‘‘thin’’ ﬁles, by data problem corrected 
Percent except as noted 
Data problem corrected  Individuals 
affected 
Distribution of individuals affected  Memo 
Effect on credit history score 
Total 
Mean change in points 
No change 







in score 1–9 points  10 or more 
points  1–9 points  10 or more 
points 
Involving credit accounts 
Failure to close a 
Paid-as-agreed account  ..............  3.2  3.6  21.7  44.1  15.8  14.9  100.0  −17.0  11.3 
Minor delinquent account ............  .7  8.1  22.4  22.0  45.1  2.4  100.0  −16.0  3.7 
Major derogatory account ............  2.4  88.7  5.4  .0  5.9  .0  100.0  −1.8  1.5 
Failure of a subprime lender to report 
a paid-as-agreed account  ..........  n.c.  4.4  35.9  38.0  16.4  5.4  100.0  −12.3  6.8 
Failure of largest student loan 
creditor to report ..................  1.0  3.4  33.6  51.8  8.0  3.2  100.0  −20.8  6.8 
Failure to report a 
Minor delinquency  ..................  n.c.  4.3  18.1  46.6  14.1  16.9  100.0  −24.9  9.8 
Credit limit  .........................  9.1  18.2  1.4  .0  36.0  44.3  100.0  −1.2  13.2 
Involving collection agency accounts 
Failure to eliminate duplicate 
collection agency accounts  ........  1.9  7.4  .8  .0  82.4  9.5  100.0  −1.0  5.1 
Reporting of 
Collection agency accounts 
under $100 .....................  15.2  48.0  3.0  .6  35.8  12.6  100.0  −5.1  9.5 
Medical collection accounts ..........  20.9  10.6  1.7  .9  52.0  34.9  100.0  −8.7  14.7 
Potentially misassigned collection 
accounts  .......................  8.6  16.3  4.1  3.1  32.7  43.7  100.0  −10.7  26.6 
Involving public records 
Reporting of duplicate public records  . . .  .3  50.4  1.7  .0  47.9  .0  100.0  −1.0  1.0 
Inclusion of lawsuits and dismissals .....  .7  22.4  1.6  .6  52.3  23.0  100.0  −6.3  13.4 
Involving creditor inquiries 
Failure to consolidate 
Multiple inquiries for auto and 
mortgage loans  .................  .9  19.1  7.2  .0  69.2  4.5  100.0  −2.1  3.4 
Other multiple inquiries ..............  9.5  4.9  3.4  .0  87.0  4.7  100.0  −1.5  4.8 
Note.  See note to table 3. A ‘‘thin’’  ﬁle has a record of a credit account but 
has fewer than four such accounts. 
response to corrections of data problems. Collection 
account problems provided an exception to this pat-
tern: Affected individuals in the credit history score 
range above 660 were the most likely to experience 
large  score  increases.  The  reason  for  this  result  is 
that  relatively  high-score  individuals  with  collec­
tion agency accounts generally have no other major 
derogatory  information  in  their  credit  records  and 
thus  can  show  signiﬁcant  score  increases  when  a 
derogatory is corrected. 
For  individuals  with  thin  ﬁles,  the  incidence  of 
data  quality  issues  involving  credit  accounts  was 
generally lower than that for all individuals, but the 
incidence  of  issues  involving  collection  agency 
accounts was somewhat higher (compare table 5 with 
table 3). The result regarding credit accounts reﬂects 
the smaller number of accounts in the credit records 
of individuals with thin ﬁles and, consequently, the 
generally lower probability that such individuals will 
have data quality issues. The result concerning col­
lection agency accounts is due to the higher probabil­
ity that people with thin ﬁles will have such accounts. 
However,  in  simulations  involving  corrections  to 
n.c.  Not calculable. 
credit accounts, the effects on the credit history scores 
of individuals with thin ﬁles were either similar to or 
substantially larger than the effects on the scores of 
persons in the general population. For example, cor­
recting  a  failure  to  close  a  paid-as-agreed  account 
resulted in a decline in credit history score that was 
twice as large, on average, for individuals with thin 
ﬁles as it was for those in the population at large. 
In  general,  older  individuals  and  those  living  in 
higher-income  and  nonminority  neighborhoods  had 
the lowest incidence of data problems (table 6). The 
most-notable exception to this pattern was for failure 
to  report  a  credit  limit,  which  was  less  common 
among  younger  individuals  and  among  individuals 
living in lower-income and predominantly minority 
neighborhoods.  We  do  not  report  the  changes  in 
credit history scores of affected individuals for these 
decompositions of the sample because the compari­
sons are difﬁcult to interpret without also accounting 
for differences in the incidence of thin ﬁles and in 
credit history scores across groups. In most cases, the 
effects of data quality problems were similar across 
groups after controlling for the differences in depth of 320  Federal Reserve Bulletin  Summer 2004 
6.	 Share of individuals affected by data problems in credit records, distributed by selected demographic characteristics 
Percent except as noted 
Data problem 
Age 
(years)  Income of census tract1 
Share of minorities 
in census tract 
(percent) 
Under 35  35–55  Over 55  Low or 
moderate  Middle  High  Less than 
10  10–80  More than 
80 
Involving credit accounts 
Failure to close a 
Paid-as-agreed account  ..............  16.9  16.6  10.1  11.3  13.1  13.7  13.4  12.9  11.3 
Minor delinquent account ............  2.0  1.4  .6  1.8  1.3  .8  1.0  1.3  2.1 
Major derogatory account ............  5.5  6.2  2.9  6.8  4.7  3.1  3.2  5.1  8.0 
Failure of a subprime lender to report 
a paid-as-agreed account  ..........  n.c.  n.c.  n.c.  n.c.  n.c.  n.c.  n.c.  n.c.  n.c. 
Failure of largest student loan 
creditor to report ..................  9.0  3.2  .8  3.4  3.3  3.8  3.0  3.8  3.3 
Failure to report a 
Minor delinquency  ..................  n.c.  n.c.  n.c.  n.c.  n.c.  n.c.  n.c.  n.c.  n.c. 
Credit limit  .........................  31.5  40.3  37.4  27.7  31.7  40.0  33.7  33.5  28.0 
Involving collection agency accounts 
Failure to eliminate duplicate 
collection agency accounts  ........  1.9  1.2  .4  2.3  1.1  .6  .7  1.4  2.7 
Reporting of 
Collection agency accounts 
under $100 .....................  15.1  11.5  5.0  17.0  11.1  6.4  8.7  11.7  16.9 
Medical collection accounts ..........  19.5  16.5  8.3  22.8  15.7  9.3  12.7  16.1  22.3 
Potentially misassigned collection 
accounts  .......................  10.8  8.8  5.3  11.6  7.9  6.1  6.4  8.5  13.1 
Involving public records 
Reporting of duplicate public records  . . .  .2  .5  .3  .4  .4  .3  .4  .4  .3 
Inclusion of lawsuits and dismissals .....  .6  1.7  1.1  1.2  1.1  1.1  1.0  1.2  1.4 
Involving creditor inquiries 
Failure to consolidate 
Multiple inquiries for auto and 
mortgage loans  .................  5.4  5.3  2.1  3.3  3.7  3.9  3.8  3.7  3.3 
Other multiple inquiries ..............  19.6  17.7  10.0  15.9  14.1  14.6  12.8  15.3  17.5 
Note.  See note to table 3. 
1.  For deﬁnition of income of census tract, see note to chart 2. 
ﬁle and in credit history score. Exceptions generally 
involved instances in which either the youngest or the 
oldest age group was disproportionately affected. For 
example, individuals over age 55 were more likely 
to  have  increases  of  more  than  10  points  in  their 
credit history scores when medical collections were 
dropped,  and  individuals  under  age  35  were  more 
likely to have large increases in their scores when 
nonreporting of a credit limit was corrected. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Available evidence indicates that the information that 
credit-reporting  agencies  maintain  on  the  credit-
related experiences of consumers, and the credit his-
tory scoring models derived from these experiences, 
have  substantially  improved  the  overall  quality  of 
credit  decisions  while  reducing  the  costs  of  such 
decisionmaking.  The  availability  of  these  data  has 
also greatly enhanced the process of screening pro­
spective  customers  to  facilitate  the  marketing  of 
credit and insurance products, thereby reducing the 
costs of such marketing by limiting solicitations to 
n.c.  Not calculable. 
customers  who  are  most  likely  to  qualify  for  the 
products. If not for the information that the agencies 
maintain, consumers on the whole would receive less 
credit at higher prices. Moreover, the credit-reporting 
system  has  become  more  comprehensive  over  the 
past decade or so with notable improvements, such as 
the adoption of common formats for reporting infor­
mation and the enhanced reporting of information on 
credit  limits  and  mortgages.  Recent  congressional 
amendments to the FCRA have advanced prospects 
for future improvements as consumer access to credit 
records and credit history scores has improved. 
Despite the beneﬁts of the credit-reporting system, 
analysts  have  raised  concerns  about  the  accuracy, 
completeness, timeliness, and consistency of agency 
records and about the effects of these shortcomings 
on the cost and availability of credit. Clearly, for the 
beneﬁts of the credit-reporting system to be realized, 
some reasonable degree of accuracy and complete­
ness of credit reports is required. Moreover, the more 
accurate and complete the information assembled by 
credit-reporting agencies, the greater the potential for 
more efﬁciency in the credit-granting process and a 
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and creditors. Over the years, a number of studies 
have focused on the contents of credit records but 
have  reached  quite  different  conclusions  about  the 
degree  to  which  such  information  is  accurate  and 
complete and about the implications of data limita­
tions for credit availability and pricing. 
This study extends earlier research and assesses the 
effects of data limitations and ambiguities in credit 
reports on the availability and pricing of credit by 
using  a  large,  nationally  representative  sample  of 
individuals with credit records from one of the three 
national  credit-reporting  agencies.  Speciﬁcally,  we 
estimate the proportion of individuals who are likely 
to  be  materially  affected  by  a  number  of  different 
data problems, and we quantify the likely effect of 
each problem on the credit history scores of individu­
als.  Because  such  effects  can  vary  across  different 
populations, we also separately evaluate the effects 
on individuals in different credit-risk categories and 
in different groups classiﬁed by age and by income 
and minority population of the neighborhoods where 
they live. We emphasize that we use the terms ‘‘data 
problem’’  and ‘‘correction’’  in their broadest sense, 
as we do not necessarily observe actual errors and the 
appropriate correction is sometimes unclear. 
This analysis of the effects of data problems on 
credit history scores indicates that the proportion of 
individuals affected by any single type of data prob­
lem appears to be small, with the exception of miss­
ing credit limits, which affected almost one-third of 
the  individuals  in  the  sample  used  for  the  simula­
tions. Moreover, in most cases, the effect of each type 
of problem on the credit history scores of affected 
individuals  was  modest.  Two  principal  reasons 
explain  this  result.  First,  most  individuals  have  a 
large number of credit accounts, and thus problems in 
any given account have only a relatively small effect 
on  the  individuals’  overall  credit  proﬁles.  Second, 
credit modelers recognize many of these data prob­
lems when they construct and weight the factors used 
in credit history scoring models. Therefore, correct­
ing the problems identiﬁed here is unlikely to sub­
stantially  change  the  risk  evaluation  and  access  to 
credit for the typical individual. 
The analysis suggests, however, that the effects of 
data problems may be more substantial in some cases 
than in others. In particular, problems with collection 
accounts  are  much  more  likely  to  have  signiﬁcant 
effects on the credit history scores of affected indi­
viduals. Missing credit limits, simply because they 
occur so frequently, also represent an important data 
quality  problem.  In  general,  individuals  with  rela­
tively low credit history scores or those with thin ﬁles 
are more likely to experience signiﬁcant effects when 
a data problem arises. The incidence of problems also 
varies  across  groups,  with  older  individuals,  those 
with higher credit history scores, and those living in 
higher-income  and  nonminority  neighborhoods 
showing the lowest incidence. 
Our analysis shows that predicting the effects of 
‘‘correcting’’  errors  is  not  straightforward.  Some-
times, effects were counterintuitive. For example, our 
analysis suggests that about one-fourth of the indi­
viduals affected by lenders’ failure to report student 
loans  would  show  increases  in  their  credit  history 
scores  as  a  result.  This  outcome  occurs  in  part 
because, somewhat surprisingly, individuals with stu­
dent loans have more accounts than does the average 
individual. The complexity of the results is under-
scored  by  the  fact  that  some  individuals  show 
increases and some show decreases for every simu­
lation.  In  large  part,  this  result  occurs  because  the 
corrections  typically  affect  more  than  one  factor, 
moving scores in different directions. This is particu­
larly true for problems with credit accounts, which 
are likely to involve multiple factors. 
The research here highlights the importance of data 
reporters’ supplying complete information in a timely 
manner. How such reporting can be fully achieved 
in a voluntary system is unclear. The current system 
relies heavily on consumers to identify and dispute 
‘‘incorrect’’  or missing items in their credit reports. 
One problem with this approach is that consumers 
have  no  incentive  to  challenge  information  that  is 
favorable to them, even if it is in error. Our research 
indicates that even when data are incomplete or in 
error,  they  often  have  little  or  no  bearing  on  an 
individual’s credit history score or access to credit. 
Currently, consumers have access only to general 
information  about  the  types  of  factors  that  are 
weighed in credit evaluation, or in the case of credit 
denials, the chief reasons for the adverse action. On 
the one hand, lack of speciﬁc information may lead 
some  consumers  to  believe  that  virtually  any  data 
quality  issue  is  pertinent  and  should  be  disputed, 
causing  the  credit-reporting  agencies  and  reporters 
to incur unnecessary costs to correct or update ﬁles. 
On the other hand, consumers may be unaware of the 
potential importance of speciﬁc data issues, such as 
missing credit limits, and may not take appropriate 
action.  Some  of  these  problems  may  be  addressed 
by consumer education, whereas others are likely to 
continue for the foreseeable future. 
Before  these  results  are  taken  as  deﬁnitive  esti­
mates of the effects of data quality issues on credit 
availability, several important caveats must be made. 
First,  we  have  investigated  only  some  potential 
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about  the  consequences  of  mistakenly  including 
account records that do not belong to an individual in 
the individual’s ﬁle. Second, we have used only one 
credit-scoring model to simulate our results and have 
relied on our approximation to the model to quan­
tify  our  results.  Third,  we  have  omitted  manual 
reviews  of  credit  records,  which  are  part  of  many 
underwriting  systems.  Such  systems  identify  and 
address many data quality issues. Finally, we have 
used  data  from  only  one  credit-reporting  agency. 
Creditors, particularly in the mortgage market, typi­
cally  obtain  data  from  all  three  national  credit-
reporting agencies for credit underwriting. Reconcil­
ing inconsistencies in data across the three agencies 
can lead to corrections of many of the data quality 
issues we have identiﬁed. 
Moreover,  we  have  analyzed  only  the  potential 
effects  on  credit  history  scores  of  addressing  data 
quality issues. We have said nothing about how such 
problems could be corrected, how much the correc­
tions might cost, or what potential gains in efﬁciency 
might result from developing models based on more 
complete and accurate data. If the current level of 
accuracy  and  completeness  is  socially  inefﬁcient, 
reaching  the  optimal  level  may  be  difﬁcult.  Credit 
information has aspects of a classic public good. The 
parties  that  bear  the  costs  of  correcting  errors  or 
providing more timely and complete information may 
not receive much beneﬁt from the improvement in 
accuracy. Further remedies, such as imposing addi­
tional  legal  liability  penalties,  may,  in  a  system 
of  voluntary  reporting,  lead  to  unintended  conse­
quences, including less information reporting and a 
less efﬁcient and effective system. Policymakers need 
to weigh all of these considerations when they deter-
mine  whether  the  current  credit-reporting  system 
should be changed and, if so, what changes should be 
made. 